RSS: Commentary

Hamas Baits Israel, Puts Arab Neighbors in a Bind

Wed, 7 Jan 2009 15:26:57 -0500

To understand the acute discomfort inflicted on the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries by the war in Gaza, it is only necessary to look at advertisements that ran in the New York Times and Washington Post less than a month ago.

In those ads, 57 Arab and Muslim governments, representing virtually every member of the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, committed themselves once again, in the most public way, to a policy of seeking peace with Israel. They restated well-known conditions, including an Israeli withdrawal from all territories seized in the 1967 war and some arrangement that would enable the Palestinians to establish their capital in Jerusalem, but the promise of full peace once those conditions are met was unequivocal.

The policy of Hamas, of course, is the opposite—no peace with Israel under any terms, and no acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. Thus when Hamas decided not to renew its shaky cease-fire with Israel and to resume rocket attacks, its leaders put themselves into open conflict with virtually all Arab and Muslim state leaderships. They practically invited Israeli retaliation, knowing full well that it would inflame popular sentiment across the Arab and Muslim worlds and take peace with Israel off the agenda for the foreseeable future.

Now the leaders of such countries as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf sheikhdoms are struggling to mollify popular sentiment by showing support for the people of Gaza while keeping their distance from Hamas. It is no easy path, as televised images of bloodied Palestinian children and distraught Gazan families tend to overpower nuance.

Egypt’s dilemma is particularly acute because it is the only country with the power to take immediate action to help the people of Gaza by opening its border. But Cairo has resisted taking such a step because it views Hamas as a dangerous agent of Islamist politics and because it does not want to be responsible for the security or welfare of Gaza’s residents. Given that Gaza’s residents largely supported Hamas in the most recent Palestinian elections—and the fact that Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel—Cairo’s reluctance to act is understandable but still politically risky.

Other countries wishing to placate the furious street demonstrators and outraged bloggers clamoring for action have few tools available other than rhetoric by which they can support the Palestinians of Gaza without helping Hamas.

In Jordan, which also has made peace with Israel, Prime Minister Nader Dhabi told parliament Sunday that the government might have to reconsider its diplomatic relations with Israel. "Jordan will look into all options, including reconsidering relations with Israel," he said. "There is no way we would remain silent when this threat affects the security of the entire region." But a decision by Jordan to break diplomatic ties with Egypt would represent a huge victory for Hamas.

Saudi Arabia has sent several planeloads of relief supplies to the Egyptian town of El Arish in the hope that Israel will permit them to be moved into Gaza. And in response to a public appeal from King Abdullah, some of the country’s richest men, including Crown Prince Sultan, have announced multi-million-dollar donations to a relief fund.

These gestures may be appreciated by the citizenry, but Abdullah’s problem is that every Arab knows the Arab League – Islamic Conference peace plan originated with him. It is widely known in the region as “the Abdullah plan.”

Abdullah was angry at Hamas even before the latest Israeli bombing campaign. He held the group responsible for divisions in the Palestinian leadership that virtually torpedoed any movement toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The unhappy reality is that whatever the military outcome in Gaza, Hamas will probably be able to claim a political victory because Israel’s relentless bombing has embarrassed and to some extent discredited the would-be Arab peacemakers. For that reason, Israel may find that it has gained a Pyrrhic victory.

Don't Count On Gulf Oil Producers to Bail Us Out

Wendy J. Chamberlin and Zubair Iqbal — Mon, 17 Nov 2008 10:08:46 -0500

One of the more alarming characteristics of the global financial meltdown is that –well, it’s global. That makes it very difficult to know where to turn to for help. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown reckoned relief might be found in Riyadh. After returning from Beijing with empty pockets, Pakistani President Asif Zardari has also gone hat-in-hand to the Saudis. There are a number of reasons why troubled economies can’t count on the cash wealthy oil producers in the Gulf for a bailout.

The hard truth is that major oil producing states in the Gulf face liquidity shortages and for the same reasons others do. They are heavily invested in the very Western banks that are in trouble owing, partly, to the sub-prime rate housing collapse in the United States and Europe.

Western economic downturn further negatively impacted the Gulf oil producers because demand for oil is down. The rest of the world simply won’t be buying as much oil as last year. The latest IMF forecasts for the Gulf region show that the combined external current account surplus of the six states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to fall by at least 7 percentage points of GDP in 2009. This drop effectively wipes out the large bonus from oil sales in 2008 that helped fund ambitious projects in the Gulf.

There are other reasons for caution. Earlier wise decisions of several GCC countries to diversify their economies by building the tourism, real estate, financial services, transportation and other non-oil sectors will help cushion the sharp decline in fiscal surpluses caused by a fall in demand for oil. But these sectors also took a hit with the global downtown.

The slowdown in GCC countries will reverberate negatively throughout the region. Currently, Gulf oil producers assist the developing economies of their neighbors by providing subsidized oil and access to jobs for expatriate labor. Any slowdown will eliminate jobs for the armies of guest workers who now send billions of dollars home to countries like Pakistan, and the Philippines. Those emerging economies have become dependent on the remittances of overseas workers and the slow-down will compound the global recession.

Outlook for major oil producers is manageable. The oil producers, under current expectations; will have comfortable foreign exchange reserves. But if the exchange rates of Gulf currencies remain tied to the appreciating U.S. dollar, the authorities in the GCC countries will find it difficult to tighten monetary policy and may encounter continued high inflationary pressures. Political pressures may also build to increase government expenditures to stimulate domestic growth, and avoid unemployment pressures.

In any case, the current global crisis will make the path toward the planned monetary union by 2010 in the GCC more challenging. This is a shame because coordination of financial policies that will be called for by the monetary union to support a common exchange rate would also help reduce destabilization of cross border capital flows.

What should be done to address the gathering storm? The GCC States could consider three broad initiatives.

First, at the national level, further improving regulation and prudential supervision could strengthen domestic banking sectors. Countries in the GCC have already taken some steps in that direction and this should be applauded. But the current crisis offers the opportunity to push for further restructuring and consolidation of distressed banks in order to minimize domestic contagion. Of course, these steps should be undertaken in concert with similar initiatives at the global level.

Second, at the regional level, a more organized approach should be taken to aiding those distressed economies in neighboring developing economies that are most negatively impacted because of their dependence on economic support from Gulf States -- like Pakistan. Consideration should be given to establishing a trust fund made up of multilateral and regional lending agencies, selected GCC countries, and the G-7 to pool resources and facilitate their effective use by vulnerable counties under IMF/World bank guidance. Regional stability hinges on the lowest common denominator. It is in everybody’s interest to prevent economic implosion in Pakistan. A rescue plan could have the advantage of presenting an opportunity to force countries like Pakistan to come to grips with entrenched structural distortions in its economy.

Finally, at the global level, the cash surplus oil producing countries of the Gulf, although also weakened, can still help the way out of the global crisis. The GCC States should be encouraged to maintain a degree of fiscal expansion so as to stimulate demand in the world economy. Such a policy is not entirely without self-interest. It would have the positive effect of increasing demand for oil exports.

Pakistan Reaches out to Iran

Wed, 29 Oct 2008 11:16:49 -0400

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Pakistan only for a day but the issues discussed were much greater and wider than the time he spent in Islamabad. His arrival on October 10 came at a time when Pakistan is wrestling hard with its worst ever internal crises. Pakistan is under siege by militant forces, which are partly traceable. There is lot of confusion about the variance and agendas of these militant groups and importantly, who actually is responsible for the start of this huge mess. Parallel with the civil war situation is worst economic nightmare accompanied by chronic breakdown of electric power. To make matters worse, there is a serious and now persistent shortage of food, surprisingly in an agricultural country. All these facts combined convinced a collective 16 US intelligence agencies to file in their recent report that there is a danger of Pakistan becoming unstable and that the country is “on the edge”.

No big breakthrough was expected from these talks but a foundation has been laid for a future framework of relations. For the last nine years, Musharraf’s regime was hesitant to be seen closer to its western neighbour, as it followed the political, economic and security objectives of the hard liners in the Bush administration. The regional dynamics and their utility was a foregone conclusion for the Musharraf junta and even the Zardari government is slow to demonstrate a noticeable change from previous flawed policies.

The meeting between the Iranian officials and their counterparts was vital for Pakistan’s interests in various fields. Pakistan’s gas reserves are rapidly depleted to meet the needs of the growing population. It is more than an energy or economic problem - rather has become a concern for Pakistan’s national security. As the agenda of these talks suggest, the prime aim was to find ways for the early implementation of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, which has shrunk to Iran-Pakistan (IP) project. India dragged itself, raising objections under one pretext or the other. In reality, India started to show its lack of interest under the pressure of the U.S., with which a civilian-nuclear cooperation deal was signed in 2005.

The gas project was conceived in 1993 and was to carry 1.1-3.4 billion cubic feet per day (BCFD) from Pars field in Iran to Pakistan. It was agreed that Iran would bear the cost from Pars gas field to Jiwani to the Iran-Pakistan border. Pakistan will be responsible for its sides of the pipeline. This delay has already raised the cost of the project from $4.16 to $8.16 billion. If completed on time, this project will not only ease the energy crisis for household consumption but will help immensely with industrial development. For an immediate remedy to ease power shortage, at least in areas adjoining the common borders, the Iranian minister said to double the providing of electricity to Pakistan, i.e., from 1000MW (already agreed) to 2000 MW and to provide power generation units.

Pakistan was quick to request deferred payments to the Iranians on oil imports. The Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi remarked: “The Iranian foreign minister has assured us that Tehran will consider our request. If that is done and Pakistan gets this facility it would help stabilize the situation and ease the balance of payments”. Given the history of Musharraf’s not so friendly attitude towards Iran, this highly favorable request might have been bit difficult for the Iranians to digest. But then, both the countries can hope for a new beginning in the post-Musharraf era.

Ignoring Pakistan’s historic close ties with Iran and China, Musharraf’s junta pursued policies that were detrimental to the security interests of Pakistan’s otherwise trusted neighbors. In 2003 there were protests by the local people in Kharan, which borders Iran, against the presence of American combat troops in the Shamsi Airbase. Apart from those, more facilities at Jacobabad, Dalbandin and Pasni were provided. Although these were apparently for Afghanistan operations, it raised eyebrows in Iran and China. Both these countries suspected Pakistan to have become a partner in their “encirclement” by the U.S. Thus Pakistan became a villain in the strategic vision of both Iran and China.

In this regard, it is in Pakistan’s strategic interest to re-adjust the policies of Musharraf. Poorly educated and trained, the commando general had no concept of global-regional political and economic dynamics. Nor did he understand the benefits of dependable and lasting strategic partnerships. His dependence on a single power isolated Pakistan in the region, letting loose the bonds that took many decades to be built. The American troops will eventually leave the area, although Pakistan can continue its friendly relations with the U.S. Both Iran and China are going to stay right on the borders of Pakistan. That is the reason why during the talks, both sides decided to coordinate policies on the situation in Afghanistan and for that purpose the Pakistani Foreign Minister announced a to visit Tehran soon. What a shift in Pakistan’s policy?

It has to be understood that the world in shifting from uni-polar to multiple orders and already a debate to this effect has started in the American academic circles. There are indicators that various regional power centers will emerge in the near future based on economic viability and backed by political strengths. In other words, nations all around the world will be adjusting their preferences – moving within their regional groupings. It will be in Pakistan’s interest to reevaluate its policies in all seriousness and correct its course. A closer cooperation and coordination with Iran and China (without compromising its relations with the Americans) can bail Pakistan out of its chronic economic and strategic troubles.

Wrong Way in Pakistan

Mon, 27 Oct 2008 15:05:33 -0400

In its eagerness to reverse the mounting insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States has embarked on a policy course that could shatter our vital strategic partnership with Pakistan. By allowing American combat forces to freely conduct raids into Pakistani territory, a move that President Bush authorized in July, the United States intends to pressure Pakistani leaders to step up the fight against militants ensconced in the borderlands. But this policy threatens cooperation between the two countries, possibly to the breaking point.

Pakistani insurgents, initially staggered by the U.S. reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks, have rebuilt their organizations in the border regions; from those havens, they launch attacks against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. The 80,000 to 120,000 Pakistani troops that have engaged the insurgents since 2003 have been funded by the United States at a cost of $1 billion a year. Yet whether it is because troops are ill-equipped, poorly trained or unmotivated, operations have been inconsistent and incomplete.

As the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda have regrouped, Washington has come to question the sincerity of Pakistan's effort. U.S. officials, concerned that elements in Pakistan's security forces are sympathetic to the insurgents and more interested in protecting than pursuing them, understandably want to deal with the threat if Pakistan will not or cannot.

But there is too much at stake for the United States to risk dangerous, misguided policies. Neither intrusions by U.S. Special Forces nor missile attacks by drones will, by themselves, take out the thousands of insurgents and their allies along the frontier. They also cannot seriously disrupt the global terrorist network. No one proposes deploying the tens of thousands of U.S. troops that it would take to saturate the tribal region and sustain any successes. And fighting a united tribal nation on its turf would cause massive civilian casualties. Even a more covert U.S. approach, designed to play radicalized tribal groups against one another, would likely reveal that their hatred for America exceeds any historic or personal animosities.

So what is left? There simply are no quick fixes. The cooperation of the Pakistani military and its intelligence services, working with a civilian government, remains indispensable. At the moment, however, the Pakistani people offer no support; polls reveal that fewer than 20 percent of Pakistanis view the United States favorably. The U.S. invasion of Iraq galvanized their belief that, as in Afghanistan, the war was essentially about defeating Muslims. The United States alienated even our Pakistani friends by pursuing policies that came to be perceived as trying to salvage the presidency of Pervez Musharraf and thwart democratic processes.

While there is some comfort to be found in President Asif Ali Zardari's views on combating terrorism, having Zadari as Musharraf's replacement in the role of U.S. point man will not help to build a popular consensus against extremism. Just last week the Parliament voted unanimously to condemn the latest U.S. missile attack on Pakistani territory. If Zardari tries to blunt criticism of the United States, his governing coalition could be threatened. And the likely victor as prime minister in a new election, Nawaz Sharif, has a strongly jaundiced view of U.S. involvement in the frontier and Afghanistan.

Proposals geared toward helping the United States regain the trust of Pakistanis are under consideration. Most, like the Biden-Lugar bill, recognize the importance of nonmilitary assistance that addresses Pakistan's endemic social problems and infrastructure deficits. Measures that help Pakistan weather its economic crisis will have an effect, as will a more favorable trade policy, especially on textiles. The United States can also be more convincing in its commitment to civilian rule and democracy.

By contrast, openly violating Pakistan's territory will make matters worse. And Pakistan can easily retaliate. Most supplies for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan are delivered to the port of Karachi and then shipped by road to Afghanistan. Early last month, trucks seeking to cross the border were stopped, a warning of what might happen if U.S. raids continue. Pakistan's most senior military officer, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, has said the army will defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. Cross-border raids risk provoking direct confrontation between U.S. and Pakistani forces and could accelerate the growing dissension in military ranks over continued Pakistani alignment with the United States.

Terrorist sanctuaries are unacceptable. But eliminating them requires Pakistan's cooperation. The bombing of the Marriott in Islamabad last month was a reminder that we are fighting different faces of the same war. Continuing to carry out uninvited, inconclusive U.S. cross-border attacks will make finding cooperation with Pakistan more elusive.

Deciding the Fate of the Mujahadin

Trita Parsi — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:30:48 -0400

The Bush administration inherited many of Iraq's problems when it invaded that country, including an Iranian terrorist organization funded and armed by Saddam Hussein the Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MKO). Though in the midst of a war on terror, the Bush administration chose in 2003 to protect 3,000 of the organization's militants and house them in a camp given to the group by Saddam — Camp Ashraf just north of Baghdad.

Ever since, the faith of this State Department-listed terrorist organization has been unclear. Hated by Iraqis for its involvement in Saddam's crimes against the Iraqi people, the Baghdad government wants to expel the group. But no country is willing to take them.

Though the Iranian government wants to put the group's leadership on trial in Iran, it seems less interested in the organization's rank and file. The European governments have little interest in taking in 3,000 battle-hardened Muslim militants, fearing that they will use Europe as a base to plan and execute further terrorist attacks.

The U.S., on the other hand, has already contradicted its own principles by giving preferential treatment to an organization on the State Department's terrorist list — even though President Bush himself pointed to the organization's patronage under Saddam Hussein as evidence of Iraq's support for international terrorists in his speech to the United Nations in September 2002.

"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran," President Bush said. To complicate matters further, if reports that the U.S. has used MKO terrorists for cross-border raids into Iran are true, then Washington certainly doesn't want these militants to end up in Iranian hands.

Washington seems doomed if it does, doomed if it doesn't.
Members of the terrorist organization have protested outside the White House this past week, angered by the Bush administration's decision to hand over Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government. The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will surrender the MKO members to Tehran, they argue, who in turn will imprison and execute them.

Though approximately 500 MKO fighters have been repatriated to Iran and no reports of abuse have emerged according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which oversaw their return, sending rank-and-file Mujahedin members to Iran against their will would be irresponsible.

Hated by the Iranian people for having fought on Saddam's side in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian Mujahedin is understandably fearful of the fate awaiting them in Iran. After all, the Iranian government systematically violates the human rights of journalists and union leaders alike, let alone anti-Iranian terrorists.
Yet, contrary to the protesters outside the White House, the issue is not a choice between freedom in Camp Ashraf and captivity in Iran.

The Mujahedin is not an effective opposition to the unpopular government in Iran as the organization's defenders in Washington claim, but a politico-religious cult that brainwashes its members, places children of Mujahedin members with other families in order to prevent parents from defecting, and who according to Human Rights Watch, maintains control by torturing its rank and file. "Members who try to leave the Mujahedin pay a very heavy price," according to Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch.

Its involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam's most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In 2004, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mujahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group.

But the vast majority of the Camp Ashraf residents are not so much members of a terrorist cult as they are victims of it. The camp is itself a prison. It may have provided Mujahedin militants with protection against ordinary Iraqis who sought to avenge their relatives killed by the Mujahedin at the behest of Saddam Hussein, but the prison has primarily enabled the leaders of the terrorist organization to prevent the rank and file from defecting.

Rather than debating where to expel the Mujahedin terrorists, help should be provided to the rank and file to break with the cult and make free choices about their future. It's the only humanitarian solution to this dilemma - and one that defeats rather than protects this anti-American terrorist group.

Saudi Arabia Opening to Tourists

Tue, 30 Sep 2008 10:56:42 -0400

Many people snickered when Saudi Arabia announced a few years ago that it would create a tourism industry as part of a long-term effort to diversify its oil-dependent economy.

Tourism in Saudi Arabia? The forbidding alcohol-free kingdom where women are veiled, shops close at prayer time, religious enforcers patrol the streets, criminals are beheaded in public and the most important sites are off-limits to non-Muslims? What a joke.

Perhaps it’s time to stop chuckling. Crystal Cruises, a luxury cruise ship line that caters to affluent Americans, has added the Saudi port city of Jeddah to its ports of call. The Crystal Serenity, a 1,080-passenger liner, is scheduled to make its first stop in Saudi Arabia on March 23, 2010.

This is intriguing news for travelers, but it represents much more for Saudi Arabia. It can be read as a statement from the country’s rulers that they are determined to open up the country and engage with the world, despite what is certain to be outraged opposition from Saudi Arabia’s xenophobic religious and social conservatives.

For decades Saudi Arabia was difficult for non-Muslims to visit, but it mattered little because few people other than pilgrims headed for Mecca wanted to go there anyway, except on business. Now under the leadership of King Abdullah, the country is opening itself more and more to outsiders—issuing multiple-entry visas, creating an international university and hosting regional sports tournaments and even cultural events. The efforts of the Supreme Commission for Tourism are part of that trend, which has been driven mostly by the economic imperatives of creating new jobs and building self-sustaining industries beyond oil and petrochemicals.

The commission, headed by Prince Sultan bin Salman, an American-educated astronaut and grandson of the kingdom’s founder, has focused mostly on domestic tourism. The aim was to persuade Saudis to spend their holidays at home, on the Red Sea beaches or in the mountains of the sparsely-populated southwest. Welcoming boatloads of non-Muslim foreigners is another matter.

The cruise passengers may provide temporary employment for bus drivers and tour guides, but it is likely their presence will agitate the monarchy’s vocal Islamist critics. In Egypt, cruise ship day-trippers travel in armed convoys because of the security threat. What will be the security challenge in Saudi Arabia, where in recent years extremists have killed French travelers and attacked the US consulate in Jeddah?

According to Crystal’s announcement, the Serenity is scheduled to arrive in Jeddah at 8 a.m. and depart at 6 p.m. the same day. This is standard practice for cruise lines, which organize day trips to onshore sites and then sail on to the next destination in the evening.

But how many of the Serenity’s passengers, who on most cruises include many Jews, will want to disembark in Saudi Arabia? The State Department’s most recent travel warning “urges U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of traveling to Saudi Arabia” where “there is an ongoing security threat due to the continued presence of terrorist groups...”

For the passengers who do go ashore, there are other questions: What will the women wear? What will there be to see? Mecca is a short drive away but off-limits. The great Nabatean ruins at Midan Saleh and the vistas of Asir National Park are too far away for day trips. And will any passengers be permitted to disembark on their own and visit Jeddah independently of an organized tour, as some routinely do in other ports?

On its Web site, Crystal describes Jeddah as if it were an Arab Barcelona: “Jeddah is a dynamic and cosmopolitan commercial hub. It is also an artistic one, with public art on display on its roundabouts. In fact, the collection, which includes works by Alexander Calder and Joan Miro, makes the city the largest open-air art gallery in the world. For shopaholics, Jeddah is a paradise...And for anyone who appreciates scenic beauty, there are lovely beaches and a picturesque corniche, where locals and visitors alike can be found relaxing and drinking in the views.”

Jeddah is indeed interesting, but also hot, crowded and choked with traffic. The restored old city and its souk would take perhaps an hour to visit. And, while there is good snorkeling in the Red Sea, few beaches permit western-style bathing attire.

Crystal Cruises is Japanese-owned and its ships are registered in the Bahamas, but its offices are in Los Angeles and the great majority of its passengers are Americans. Like most cruise lines, it is always looking for new and offbeat destinations, and its 2010 itinerary in the Middle East reflects that quest. In addition to Jeddah, the Serenity is scheduled to call at Bandar Abbas, Iran; Khasab, Oman, on the Strait of Hormuz; and Ashdod, Israel.

President Zardari - Hope or Despair?

Wed, 24 Sep 2008 11:09:37 -0400

Asif Ali Zardari was voted President of Pakistan by an overwhelming majority, just as the post February election alignment had projected. In the national and provincial elections, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) emerged as the single largest party in the National Assembly and did well in all of the four provinces, especially in Sindh. Taking advantage of its strength, the co-chairman of the PPP was able to maneuver a majority in Baluchistan and a coalition in the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab. At present, with the exception of Punjab, it is a partner in the government in all the political arrangements of Pakistan. Many analysts give credit for this success to Zardari, citing his political “wisdom and skills”. Others agree that his rise to power would not have been possible without compromises made with Musharraf and other actors of the establishment. Whatever the reality, Zardari is in charge of the political landscape of Pakistan, with enormous powers provided by a distorted constitution from the rule of General Musharraf.

Article 41 of the 1973 Constitution regards the president as a symbol of the federation of Pakistan. Thus, the president is expected to be above political divides. The constitution in its original form provides a parliamentary form of government so the real power rests with the prime minister and the national parliament. In the past, the three presidents, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar steered clear of the internal political agendas of their political parties. The founding fathers of Pakistan visualized a parliamentary democracy. That should be the only objective of the current political actors.

Regardless of the debate about whether or not real power rests in the office of the prime minister and the parliament, the three branches of government – executive, legislature and judiciary must operate on the basis of checks and balances in order for a healthy political process to function. With the election of Asif Ali Zardari, the balance shifts heavily in favor of the president, thus compromising the spirit of parliamentary democracy. President Zardari’s position as the co-chairman of the ruling party makes him a kind of super prime minister. Furthermore, the judges deposed on November 2, 2007 by President Musharraf have not been restored and so the superior judiciary comes under the influence of the newly elected president.
To create a workable political system and a true spirit of democracy, President Zardari should take a number of corrective steps. First, the judiciary must be restored to its November 2, 2007 position. This should not take place on a pick-and-choose basis. A law minister recently spoke of the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry taking his oath from the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) Chief Justice, which is a discouraging sign given that the PCO was established under the previous emergency rule. It gives the impression that the new government wants to have a judiciary of its choice. It is not a question of personal likes and dislikes. It is a question of adhering to the principle that a commander of the army has no legitimacy to arrest or remove judges. Musharraf’s act was illegitimate and immoral act and must be reversed.
The second measure Zardari must take is the repeal of the 17th amendment of the constitution and other changes in the supreme law. These amendments and changes were introduced to enhance Musharraf’s powers, effectively transforming the constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential form of government and giving the president enormous powers. President Zardari can undo these wrongs by surrendering these powers to the prime minister and to the parliament, thus restoring the true spirit of the 1973 constitution. There is a lot of suspicion in the country that Zardari might take only cosmetic steps, thus retaining the president’s current powerful position.

Even with reduced constitutional powers, President Zardari can influence the process of peace making in the border areas of Northwest Pakistan and the Baluchistan province. The new president can use his influence to defuse the conflict through dialogue with his fellow Pakistanis. Musharraf alienated these vital sections of society by resorting to ruthless force. He acted like a proxy to a big power, looking after their interests rather than protecting his own citizens. President Zardari could also enhance his prestige by seeking the whereabouts of missing Pakistanis – a huge issue which directly relates to the humiliation of the entire nation.

President Asif Ali Zardari has gained the confidence of the legislatures. He should feel confident and reassured enough to restore the rule of law and with it the sovereignty, respect and dignity of Pakistan.

Israel's Kadima Contest

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 18:05:52 -0400

Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni narrowly won the Kadima party’s internal election this week to become chairwoman of Israel’s largest party and will replace Ehud Olmert within a few days. Olmert will remain as Prime Minister, however, until Livni succeeds in assembling a majority coalition in the Knesset. She has 42 days to accomplish that task; new elections will be called automatically if she fails, which would probably not be held until February at the earliest.

It should be noted that Livni won by only 1.1% of the vote ahead of her chief rival, former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. Hurt and angry in the wake of his narrow defeat, Mofaz has announced he is taking a “time out” from politics. This presumably means he will not lead an internal opposition to Livni but also might possibly erode her support in the center-right of the party and the country.

Livni has a good chance of putting together a coalition, but it is by no means assured. The second largest party, Labor, is headed by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has made no secret of his intense ambition to regain the post. However, he realizes that Labor is unlikely to gain in new elections held soon, so it will most likely join Kadima, as will the small left-Zionist Meretz party and the remnants of the new Pensioners party. All told, this only provides about 57 of the 61 votes needed for a majority.

Theoretically, there are two ways to get to the magic 61. One is to include some or all of the three “Arab parties”, which together have ten votes. This is highly unlikely, as Israel has never had a coalition including these parties and many Jewish Israelis might well consider it illegitimate. Additionally, although Livni is a dove in the larger Israeli political context, it is unlikely that they would be willing to endorse her security policies, i.e., the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

Livni’s background as a former hawk is very similar to Olmert’s, and her current views have followed the same trajectory as his. The one exception is that he still promises an agreement with the Palestinians before he leaves office and before Bush’s Jan. 1 deadline while she, like virtually everyone else, has apparently given that up. We may assume she will continue with the ongoing negotiations that she is already leading. These would include the same promises to give up most of the West Bank to a Palestinian state, and the same constraints not to immediately discuss Jerusalem or address the Palestinian demand to the “right of return”. The probability, at least until the end of the year, is a continuation of the current situation.

In the longer term, things will not be so smooth. Palestinian President Abbas’s term ends in January and there are indications that he will try to extend it for a year, although Hamas and others may not accept this. Also, Israel’s 6-month tahdiya (calming) with Hamas in Gaza is due to expire in December, and Hamas will almost certainly demand concessions to renew it. Perhaps most important, the entire Middle East is in a comparative political lull, almost certainly in anticipation of the election of the new US President and the start of his term.

Since a coalition with the three Arab parties is ruled out, Livni is left with the more likely alternative: a coalition including the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party Shas. They have twelve Knesset votes and are already a member of the current coalition. However, Shas is extremely unpopular with Israel’s secular population and has announced that it will demand considerable funding for its network of schools and other institutions in return for joining. There is also some speculation that they would be reluctant to support a female Prime Minister (the first since Golda Meir resigned in 1974). Shas is also moderately confident of its fate in new elections but cannot be sure it would be included in a government at that point.

If Livni fails to form a viable government and new elections are called next month, the probable winner would be the right-wing parties, especially Likud’s Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, who would be the likely new Prime Minister, barring unexpected developments (which are always possible). In any case, Olmert will remain Prime Minister until a new government is sworn in, probably in 6-7 months if a general election is held.

However, it is more likely that, following melodramatic negotiations, Livni will get her majority and will form a government. In that case, new general elections must be held within two years, most probably sometime in late 2009 or early 2010.

The old cliché of plus ca change, plus la meme chose is completely applicable here. It is improbable even if Livni forms her government that she will emerge as a strong leader in the mold of many of Israel’s earlier Prime Ministers. Rather, the divisions within Israel and the stalemate with the Palestinians both seem likely to continue.

For Americans concerned about Israelis and Palestinians however, the important question is: which of the current candidates for president is most likely to help the parties break the stalemate? Without constructive American help, more decades of stalemate and bloodshed may ensue.

Iraq: Security Gains in Jeopardy

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:38:11 -0400

The bulk of the improvement in security in much of Iraq over the past two years stems not from the surge, but rather the largely Sunni Arab “Awakening.” Yet, revived Iraqi government hostility toward the Awakening, and provocative moves by Iraq’s Kurds have made those security gains potentially very fragile, raising the risk of a significant rebound in violence.

The surge initiated by President Bush in January 2007 had two main objectives: to stabilize Baghdad during a wave of horrific sectarian violence spanning many mixed areas of the country, pitting Sunni Arab against Shi’a, and to create a period of calm during which there could be sectarian reconciliation. Only a small portion of the roughly 29,000 U.S. soldiers included in the surge was dispatched to predominantly Sunni Arab al-Anbar Governate, the scene of heavy fighting between U.S. forces on the one hand and Sunni Arab insurgents and elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on the other. Virtually all other surge-related U.S. troops were deployed into Baghdad.

The most important element in dramatically reducing violence was not the surge, but rather a deal between U.S. forces and Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements in late 2006 that translated the Awakening among many Sunni Arabs into stunning progress in terms of overall security and reduced U.S. casualties. Elements of the Awakening first approached U.S. forces seeking a deal two years earlier.

In summer 2004, Sunni Arab tribal leaders and notables, some with ties to the insurgency and most from al-Anbar Governate, asked that U.S. forces enter into a truce that would allow all concerned to join in an effort to destroy AQI. Many Sunni Arabs had become enraged over excesses on part of AQI’s militant Islamic fighters.

There was, however, one important condition: these Sunni Arabs would not make their peace with the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. At a time when elections for a sovereign Iraqi government still lay ahead and the process of putting in place a new constitution was incomplete, Washington declined. The U.S. persuaded some of those who had approached us to meet with then Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to try to work something out, but the talks failed. As a result, Sunni Arab insurgents and U.S. forces would fight on for two more years, at great cost to both. In addition, AQI remained largely free to continue its reign of terror, particularly anti-Shi’a suicide bombings.

Only when those same bombings triggered massive Sunni Arab-Shi’a sectarian violence following AQI’s bombing of the Shi’a Golden Mosque in north-central Iraq in early 2006 did the U.S. once again consider a separate deal with armed Sunni Arabs aimed at AQI. In the face of bitter objections from Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, the U.S. finally agreed to a conditional ceasefire with many Sunni Arab insurgent and tribal elements, allowing them to arm and to organize. By late 2007, it was clear that this arrangement, which expanded far beyond al-Anbar Governate, vastly reduced U.S. casualties and allowed both sides to administer crippling blows to AQI.

The Iraqi government never signed onto the overall arrangement, despite the nearly 90% reduction in anti-Shi’a AQI suicide bombings and a major shift on the part of those in the Awakening (eventually numbering around 100,000 fighters called “Sons of Iraq” or SOI’s) who now wanted to be incorporated into government security forces. Likewise, despite some measures in that direction, the government has dragged its feet on broader reconciliation with the Sunni Arab community, even though the surge was aimed at tamping down sectarian violence to provide the calm needed for that very purpose.

The government’s attitude became especially problematic when the U.S. turned control of SOI-dominated al-Anbar Governate back to the Iraqi government in recent weeks and made clear that the U.S. could not continue paying SOI’s much longer. The Baghdad government, however, had only agreed to accept a limited number of SOI’s into its security forces, and even doing that had proceeded at a snail’s pace.

Making matters even worse, over the past several weeks, Maliki declared over 600 SOI’s “criminals” subject to immediate arrest and his intent to end the SOI’s this year. That, of course, already has caused some SOI’s to desert and others to return to the residual Sunni Arab insurgency. Talks between SOI leaders and the government to increase the number of SOI’s taken into the security forces last week reportedly ended in stalemate.

If that were not enough, armed Kurdish Peshmerga personnel have gained control of increased areas--some far beyond the boundaries of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) zone--arresting or apparently seeking to displace inhabitants of such areas, many of them Sunni Arabs. Kurdish moves have been so provocative in some locales that even Maliki finally reacted, using non-Kurdish Iraqi army units to force a few Peshmerga withdrawals. Nonetheless, Kurdish flags are flying defiantly in numerous Kurdish areas well beyond the KRG, which contain substantial Sunni Arab populations. This—coupled with arrests and harassment-has infuriated Arab notables and SOI’s elements.

So Sunni Arab elements comprising the Awakening now find themselves assailed on two fronts, with levels of tension rising ominously. It would be sadly ironic if the Awakening (the main driver of improved security in so many areas beyond the more restricted scope of the surge) was to collapse, many SOI’s were to turn against the government, and, now, Iraq’s Kurds (or both).

These risky Iraqi government actions stem, in part, from the Bush Administration’s unconditional support. In late 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended that U.S. support for the Iraqi government be made conditional, linked to progress on matters like reconciliation, in an effort to make it more likely that Maliki & Co. would avoid these nasty scenarios and to prevent Washington from being viewed as complicit in any government misbehavior. Failure to do so was a mistake, but there do not appear to be indications that the President is contemplating any change in this questionable course.

Decision Time for the GCC

Dr. Hani Findakly — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 11:39:54 -0400

Tying the Persian Gulf countries to the dollar has bought decades of stability and prosperity. The time has come, however, to cut the tie.

The dollar has been a steady friend to the Gulf. In a region of small economies dominated by public sector spending, virtually all revenues have been in the form of dollar-denominated oil sales. As young and often sparsely populated countries in the 1960s and 1970s, they lacked the institutional framework—central banks, capital markets, regulatory agencies, and economic managers—that an effective monetary policy requires. Furthermore, their economic growth was relatively weak for decades. Western impressions notwithstanding, periods of dramatic growth in the Gulf were the exception rather than the rule from the 1970s to 1990s. While there were short periods of exceptional growth, real economic growth only averaged an anemic two percent over three decades.

A fixed exchange rate link to the dollar helped. It provided an anchor of stability as the Gulf economies got on their feet. It also created stable currencies and relatively predictable levels of government income and expenditure.

But in the last decade, everything has changed, and things are unlikely to go back to how they once were. Emerging markets around the world have blossomed, as good economic policies, enhanced governance, and rapidly rising global trade have combined to create some of the most auspicious conditions for growth that the world has ever known. In addition, and in part because of these conditions, persistently strong demand has boosted real commodity prices in a more sustained way than they have been in almost a century.

For the countries of the Gulf, the windfall is nothing short of remarkable. At roughly $140 per barrel, the region is amassing capital at an unprecedented rate, with projected surpluses approaching $400 billion per year, or an average $20,000 per citizen. In smaller, energy-rich countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, the per capita surpluses are several times higher. In addition, regional governments have learned their lessons from the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike past oil booms, in which governments spent with enthusiastic abandon, the governments of the region have become far more strategic. Now they seek to diversify their economies, to invest in their deficient physical, financial, and social infrastructures, and most importantly in the education of their people.

Even so, economies are overheating. Inflation is in double digits, growth is exploding, consumer loans are at precarious levels of personal income, and speculative bubbles in housing and the stock market threaten medium-term stability. These conditions will undermine the region’s capacity to recruit and retain their workforce—still 40 percent foreign overall and with a much higher percentage in the private sector. These workers, who are paid in Gulf currencies linked to the dollar, have seen the value of their repatriated wages shrink, while high inflation severely limits their capacity to save. Labor unrest is a growing problem, and one with no simple solution.

This decade’s prosperity presents Gulf policymakers with a serious dilemma. They have little control over the oil windfalls flooding into their economies, and the virtual absence of taxation in these countries means that governments lack an important tool of economic governance. The fixed link to the dollar compels central banks to mirror the Fed’s low interest rate policy needed to stimulate the U.S. economy, leaving their own economies woefully over-stimulated. Indeed, the governments have precious few tools to shape their local economies.

Of the few tools at their disposal is a currency float. Doing so now would be especially timely. Foreign exchange reserves are at an all-time high. The managerial talent pool is there. And while it will take time to fully develop the money markets necessary to conduct effective monetary policy, all of the elements are in place to begin that process.

Cutting historic ties to the dollar would be both courageous and controversial. Some would see it as a political act rather than an economic one, as if any close U.S. ally with a major economy ties its own currency to the dollar. In fact, none do.

Others fear that the Gulf nations will lose the security of the greenback. In reality, the opposite is true. A float would grant these countries greater stability, not only to stem inflation now, but even more so were the U.S. economy to grow and interest rates to rise at a time when Gulf economies were in an economic reversal.

The economic security of the move could be enhanced if the Gulf countries coordinated their actions, paving the way for greater regional coordination and integration. Doing so would smooth out speculative portfolio flows, help synchronize economic cycles, fight inflation, and ensure competitive access to both skilled and unskilled labor.

The question is no longer why the Gulf states should depart from their dollar peg. Instead, it is why they should remain tied to the dollar despite the very obvious costs. To their credit, Gulf states are managing their wealth far more prudently now than in past oil booms. Rigidly remaining tied to a dollar peg that distorts their economies is no longer prudence, it is folly.

General Musharraf, A Dignified Exit

Thu, 14 Aug 2008 14:45:59 -0400

“Old Generals never die, they just fade away.” After nearly nine years as Pakistan’s military dictator and President, it is time for Pervez Musharraf to step aside in the interests of his country.

Musharraf’s long ride as head of the “world’ s most dangerous country” is as remarkable for its achievements as it is for its disappointments. It is fair to argue that he was the right man in 1999 when a military coup ousted civilian politicians whom the public saw as voraciously corrupt. Musharraf implemented an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, surrounded himself with world-class technocrats to steer the economy and promised a return to democracy.

General Musharraf was the right man again in 2001. He reversed Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan that provided safe harbor to Al Qaeda. Pakistan’s military intelligence service, the ISI, worked seamlessly for a couple of years with the FBI and CIA to bring down Al Qaeda safe houses in cities throughout Pakistan.

The Pakistani people benefited. The US lifted the failing economy with grant aid and removed sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Foreign investment and remittances poured in. The economy grew at an average of more than 7% annually. Musharraf liberalized the media and presided over an earthquake relief program in 2005 that avoided what could have been a humanitarian disaster.

But, his failures were as striking as his successes.

Extremism under his leadership spread like a California wild fire. Al Qaeda reestablished training camps and a global operation via the Internet from the Afghan-Pakistan border region. Musharraf’s supposedly first-rate Pakistan Army and ISI couldn’t find and dismantle Mullah Omar’s Taliban followers – presumably being directed from the provincial capital of Quetta. And now, at a time when extremist violence openly targets Pakistan’s officials and threatens national stability, the ISI reportedly has aided militant groups in an attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

Musharraf’s counter terrorism efforts are unpopular with his people as well. Eight out of ten Pakistanis oppose military action against the Taliban. They blame Musharraf for doing the bidding of the Bush Administration.

Musharraf’s fall from grace with his public was in large part due to his resistance to the transition to civilian democracy. His personal contempt for civilian politicians was palpable. Only after intense international and public pressure did he finally take off his dual hat as both Chief of the Army and president.

Perhaps the episode that began Musharraf’s final slide in popularity was his assault on the independent judiciary. Musharraf tried to remove Supreme Court Justice Iftikar Chaudhry in March 2007. Tens of thousands of Pakistan’s most educated people took to the streets to support the chief justice. Musharraf forcibly put down the demonstrations. Judges and lawyers were placed under house arrest. Last November, he imposed emergency rule, suspended the constitution and then amended it to provide more powers to presidency. Musharraf then used emergency powers to tilt the impending elections in favor of his party. The Musharraf of 2007 was not the same leader of 1999 and 2001.

Still, Pakistani democracy was resilient. In a tragic way, the assassination of leading political figure Benazir Bhutto just before the election ensured enough new voters to overwhelm any fix in place. The new Chief of the Army, General Kiyani is credited for refusing to allow Pakistan’s strongest institution to be used by the government to manipulate the February, 2008 election.

That should have been the start of a happier story for Pakistan. But six months after the civilian government assumed power, it found itself paralyzed over how to deal with the president and the judiciary. After squabbling for months, the coalition government now has agreed to proceed with impeachment proceedings against Musharraf. The process of bringing a no-confidence vote to the provincial assemblies, followed by hearings on impeachment charges by the regional assembly and senate, could paralyze Pakistan’s government for weeks to come and create a major distraction from the country's pressing problems.

President Musharraf could fight back against the elected government. He could use his constitutional powers to dissolve the parliament, a move that would ignite a popular uprising. To prevail Musharraf would need the army to join him at the barricades. To its credit, the army is neither anxious to see the impeachment of its former chief or to intervene on his behalf.

The logical way out would be for the military and others, including the Bush Administration, to press Musharraf to resign in exchange for an agreement by the parties to take no further action against him. Anything else will plunge the Pakistan into a prolonged crisis from which extremist elements could be the prime beneficiaries.

Israel's Prime Minister is Going; Where Does That Leave Peace?

Fri, 1 Aug 2008 19:13:12 -0400

The announcement by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert that he would not contest the leadership in his Kadima Party’s internal elections next month and would resign as soon as a new Prime Minister is in office was widely expected. But it still set off a political tumult in Israel, partly because the realistic range of options for his successor is so wide. Olmert may indeed step down as soon as mid-October but he could also end up staying in office until spring of 2009.

The transition is a gradual process. First come the internal elections within the Kadima Party. The two main candidates are Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Transportation Minister Sha’ul Mofaz, a former Minister of Defense and Israeli Defense Force (spell out) Chief of Staff. Livni now seems the favorite but this could change as the internal campaign heats up.

What does Livni represent? Most say she would continue Olmert’s policies, especially with regard to peace. She has been leading the Israeli delegation to the current negotiations and both her political background and current positions are -identical. Of course this could change if she were in office, but that seems unlikely.

Olmert was seen as a weak Prime Minister but an extraordinary politician, holding his government together for two years after most had written its epitaph. Livni has shown no indication of similar skills. Even if she is chosen as Kadima’s candidate, she may face rebellion within party ranks or from its two coalition partners Shas and Labor. However, her greatest ally is fear of new general elections if Kadima cannot put together a government, since many Knesset members, especially from Kadima and its coalition party, Labor, might lose their seats if the election were held soon

Livni’s rival, Sha’ul Mofaz is on Kadima’s rightward fringe and probably would be as comfortable ideologically in Likud, whence he and Livni came. While he would be under pressure to continue negotiations, especially from the US, his heart probably would not be in it. It is difficult to imagine him announcing historic concessions, even more difficult to imagine him implementing them.

Any attempt to put together a government in this way would most likely take place by the end of October, after the Jewish holidays. If no government is formed by then new general elections for the whole country would be scheduled, probably for February or March 2009, shortly after the new US administration is in place but probably before it would be ready to deal with the complexities of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Ironically, according to Israeli law, Olmert will remain as caretaker Prime Minister until his successor is chosen and the new government sworn in, whether with or without general elections.

Until recently, the assumption was that, if general elections were held, former Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu of the rightwing Likud party would be a shoo-in, which is why he wants them soon and Kadima doesn’t. However, a new poll has startled Israel’s politicians by indicating that, if these elections were held, Livni might beat Netanyahu. It also shows her to be an appreciably stronger candidate than her Kadima rival, Mofaz.

What does this mean for the already ailing Annapolis peace process? Can it produce a peace settlement by the end of the year, as President Bush clearly desires?

A weakened Israeli government would be even less likely to be able to make peace, though Livni would certainly try, as will Olmert, for as long as he is caretaker Prime Minister. However, should there in fact be new elections next year (that is, if Kadima cannot avoid them), and if Netanyahu and the Israeli right were to form a government, chances of any peace settlement in the foreseeable future would drop dramatically. Such a government would be unlikely to engage in negotiations, would be liable to retake Gaza (most likely with high Israeli and Palestinian casualties) and assume a more belligerent pose toward Iran. It would probably be extremely suspicious of any relations with the Palestinian Authority and wary of any peace initiatives emanating from the United States.

Thus, in the short run, there is a hope, though not a strong one, of some sort of agreement if Kadima stays in power. In the longer run, it depends on who wins the next Israeli elections, whenever they are held.

Resolving Old Rivalries

Karl F. Inderfurth and Wendy J. Chamberlin — Thu, 17 Jul 2008 12:37:49 -0400

The deadly suicide attack last week on the Indian Embassy in Kabul has put Afghanistan in a familiar but unwanted position - a "back to the future" scenario, caught up again in the intrigues and suspicions of its neighbor, Pakistan, and Pakistan's neighbor, India. But this time around, the stakes are too high to replay old rivalries.

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan said that Pakistan's intelligence service, known as the ISI, was behind the Indian Embassy bombing. His government announced it would boycott a series of meetings with Pakistan until "bilateral trust" was restored.

Indian officials said the attack was intended to send a stark message to India: Get out of Afghanistan. India's national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, declared that the ISI must be "destroyed" and that if things continued in this manner, there would be no choice but to "retaliate in kind."

Pakistan's prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, declared all accusations "baseless" and "malicious."

It was not supposed to be this way.

The February election in Pakistan was a positive return to civilian-led democracy in that country. The new leadership in Islamabad said it wanted to improve long-troubled relations with Kabul. But five months later the civilian coalition in Pakistan is weak and in crisis.

Internal struggles between Pakistan's two major parties - the PPP, led by the late Benazir Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and the PML-N, led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif - have left a foreign policy vacuum that radical elements, almost certainly with ISI connections, have exploited to advance their own agenda. That agenda is a flashback to the period before 9/11, when the ISI believed it needed a friend (Taliban) in Kabul to offset Indian influence in Afghanistan.

Combined with the many other challenges facing Afghanistan today, the recent revival of the Pakistan-Indian rivalry makes the odds of Afghanistan becoming a stable country that much more remote. A multi-pronged diplomatic initiative by the parties involved, with strong international support, is urgently needed to turn this situation around.

Reducing antagonisms between Afghanistan and Pakistan must be the top priority. Afghanistan has legitimate concerns, especially about the resurgent Taliban's use of Pakistani territory as a safe haven. Kabul blames Islamabad for this. Islamabad's full and continuous cooperation to stop cross-border attacks in Afghanistan, as well as ISI interference in Afghanistan's affairs, is an essential condition for stabilizing relations.

For its part, Pakistan is aggrieved at Karzai's public finger-pointing at Pakistan after every spectacular extremist attack, like the Taliban raid that liberated 400 prisoners in Afghanistan. The truth is that both Kabul and Islamabad share the same enemies. Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISI-supported terrorist groups that operated in Kashmir, and even the old militant groups that the United States once supported to fight against the Soviets now stage attacks on Pakistani, Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces. A mutual effort to counter the common threat would be a more productive approach.

Pakistan and India also should build on their positive diplomatic developments over the past several years to tackle the very sensitive issue of Afghanistan. Approaching talks in New Delhi between the foreign ministers of the two countries provide an excellent opportunity to do this. But it won't be easy.

India will claim it has legitimate interests in Afghanistan and that it is a major donor in the international effort to rebuild that country. Pakistan will charge that India is running operations out of its many consulates in Afghanistan to stir trouble across the border, especially to fan the flames of the anti-Islamabad insurgency in Baluchistan. Pakistan sees itself as potentially caught in a vice between its western and eastern neighbors.

But these long-standing concerns are now being trumped by a new reality, the need for India and Pakistan to look beyond their traditional rivalries and agree on a joint strategy to confront the extremists operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

"Whatever problems we had with Pakistan," says C. Raja Mohan, a leading Indian security analyst, "Pakistan had been a buffer between India and the badlands. Now the buffer is falling apart. Afghanistan needs to be stabilized. Pakistan needs to be stabilized. This requires more drastic action."

Direct talks also present the opportunity for India and Pakistan to address the one issue that has long bedeviled their relations - the dispute over Kashmir. After a long history of playing a "dirty game" with terrorist groups against India, the tables have turned. The terrorist groups present a much more serious threat to Pakistan's internal stability than they offer as instruments of asymmetrical warfare against India. Today's common security interests of India and Pakistan should drive the two countries toward finding a settlement over Kashmir.

Pakistan's foreign minister, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, recently said in Washington: "The time is now for taking bold steps to take Pakistan and India out of a cycle of hostility, acrimony, and mutual suspicion." That advice also applies to efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. All three countries need to engage in active, high-level diplomacy aimed at stemming the spread of extremism in their common neighborhood. Their security fates are intertwined.

The State of Sunni-Shiite Relations in Saudi Arabia and Why it Matters

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi — Wed, 16 Jul 2008 15:17:04 -0400

The ‘Shiite crescent’ has become a popular intellectual shortcut in media and policy circles to explain Muslim affairs. Yet, it is a flawed theory that ignores the complexity of religious, national, local and tribal allegiances that include, exclude or overlap each other in the Middle East. It does not account for a number of factors including the occasional inter-Shiite fighting in Iraq. In an interesting twist, two Shiites – Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – happen to be the most popular leaders in overwhelmingly Sunni Egypt (and probably most of the Middle East) according to a poll conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo. So much for Sunni-Shiite mutual hatred. This theory may be inadequate and over-inflated, but it refers to a real problem of rising tension between Sunnis and Shiites in areas throughout the Middle East.

One crucial but under-discussed arena of Sunni-Shiite relations is Saudi Arabia. Approximately 10 percent of the Kingdom’s population is reported to be Shiite. Since the Kingdom’s establishment in 1932, Shiite rituals have been subjected to significant constraints and Shiites have been marginalised and intermittently repressed. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have all pointed out the systematic social, political, religious and economic discrimination of Shiites by Saudi state institutions and ulama (clergy). Since 1993, Saudi rulers have attempted some rapprochement by engaging Shiite leaders, although significant advances have yet to materialise.

Sunni-Shiite relations in Saudi Arabia are important for the rest of the Muslim world. Indeed, the Kingdom’s religious establishment often adheres to a puritanical and intolerant version of Sunni Islam and holds sway over many radical Muslim circles thanks to its worldwide network of mosques. As a result, the Saudi ulama bear much responsibility in the propagation of anti-Shiite feelings, but they are also in a strategic position to soothe tensions between the two communities. A radical break with well-established anti-Shiism is unlikely; observers of the Kingdom know that its inhibited culture and desire for total consensus makes Switzerland look like a fast-changing country.

However, there are two reasons to believe that the time is ripe for bold action. First, despite the slight détente in the Kingdom in the 1990’s, tensions have been mounting since the advent of civil war in Iraq and the reassertion of Iranian and Hezbollah influence, increasing alarm about regional Shiite domination. Many young Saudis who engage in jihad in Iraq are motivated inter alia by fervent anti-Shiite sentiments. This heated situation has also engendered an increase in despicable acts of vandalism such as cemetery profanation and the torching of Shiite mosques, threatening the inter-communal status quo.

Secondly, Saudi King Abdullah is investing much hope in his calls for interfaith dialogue. Earlier this month he concluded an interfaith conference in Madrid, which he hopes to be the first step in a sustained dialogue process. Christian and Jewish religious authorities worldwide have been involved and many declared their support for the King’s overture. It is quite an undertaking for the leader of a country that constrains or bans any non-Islamic religious act, sign or place of worship and he has attracted much attention. The legitimacy and credibility of the King’s move will, to a large extent, depend on the state of Sunni-Shiite relations within the Kingdom.

Recent moves indicate that the King is aware of this situation and wants to make advances, even at the price of infuriating some members of the ulama. Twenty two radical Saudi clerics issued a religious edict (fatwa) this month saying that Hezbollah’s fight against Israel in Lebanon is actually a disguise to conceal the movement’s anti-Sunni agenda. They proclaimed that Shiites followed ‘infidel precepts’. Reaction was swift: Mohammed al-Nujaimi, a prominent member of the religious establishment and a cleric one wouldn’t exactly call ‘liberal’, was dispatched last week to mend fences with the Shiites. He met with the leader of the Shiite community, Hassan al-Saffar, and other representatives to condemn the edict. There is good reason to believe that the King was behind this effort. By Saudi standards this is a bold move, as the rulers of the Kingdom are always wary of antagonizing the ulama, who provide them with legitimacy. Anti-Shiite sentiment is one of the main tenets of the ulama’s Wahabbi ideology and the King’s overture is unlikely to be appreciated.

There is good reason to be sceptical about the outcome of the King’s outreach to the Shiite community, but mounting tensions and the King’s interfaith projects have created a state of affairs in which the Saudi Shiite situation cannot be shunned any longer. If a decent modus vivendi is worked out, it can have some impact on Sunni-Shiite relations worldwide thanks to the Kingdom’s special position within the Islamic world, and can reassert the House of Saud over an obscurantist and anachronistic ulama. Inshallah.

Saudi Arabia, Iran and the US

Thu, 3 Jul 2008 12:10:00 -0400

Saudi Arabia has been a strategic ally of the United States for more than 60 years. Despite occasional differences, Riyadh was a firm – and generous – partner of American policy in the Cold War and in distant conflicts from Afghanistan to Nicaragua. President Bush and King Abudullah reaffirmed the two countries’ ties during Bush’s two visits to the Kingdom this year.

But the Saudis are putting a good deal of distance between themselves and the United States in one of the most important arenas of American Middle East policy – Iran.
Riyadh does not endorse U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and to put additional pressure on the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And the Saudis firmly oppose any move by the United States or Israel to use military force in an effort to shut down the Iranian nuclear program.

After a week of conversations in Riyadh with Saudi government officials, academics, businessmen and journalists, the reasons for this Saudi reluctance are not a mystery. There are reportedly some officers in the Saudi armed forces who favor a confrontation with Iran, but most Saudis forsee short-term dangers and long-term strategic damage in any such policy.

In simplest terms, the Saudis recognize that Iran is a major regional power, a potentially agressive neighbor that is not going away. Iran is much more capable of making trouble for Saudi Arabia than the other way around, and therefore the Kingdom’s security over time requires accommodation with Iran, however difficult it may be to manage the relationship. Americans and other foreigners may come and go, but Iran and its nearly 80 million people—almost four times the population of Saudi Arabia--will remain, a few miles across the Gulf.

Relations with Iran presented few problems for Riyadh before the Iranian revolution,. Iran under the Shah was also a Cold War ally of the United States, the two countries were founding partners in OPEC, and Iran in those days made no effort to export the Shiite version of Islam.

With the rise of the Islamic Republic, Tehran followed a different path, challenging the religious supremacy of Saudi Arabia and denouncing Riyadh’s alliance with the United States. The Iranians were furious over Saudi Arabia’s support for Iraq in its war with Iran. Iranian pilgrims to Mecca began staging anti-Saudi and anti-American political demonstrations, which culminated in gunfire when rioting erupted in 1987. The Saudis reported that 402 people died.

This was an intolerable provocation for a regime that bases its legitimacy on its custodianship of Islam’s holy sites, and Riyadh broke diplomatic relations with Iran. Mobs sacked the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Relations were at their nadir, not to improve until the Iran-Iraq war ended and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president of Iran.

The Saudis remember those years with dread and do not wish to repeat them, especially in pursuit of a policy they do not believe will succeed. Having reached a modus vivendi with Iran in the 1990s, they are determined to stay on peaceful terms. King Abdullah made symbolic public declaration of this policy last year when he invited Adhmadinejad personally to the pilgrimage.

Of course the two countries differ on many issues – on Lebanon, oil production, Iranian support for Shiite political movements, and the prospect of peace with Israel – but in the Saudi view, these can be managed. The Saudis were angered recently when Ahmadinejad publicly criticized their long-time foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, but they swallowed hard and let it pass.

A policy of confrontation, on the other hand, could leave Saudi Arabia vulnerable to Iranian troublemaking on many fronts, beginning with agitation among Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority. And in the event of military action against Iran, the Saudis fear that they would be the first targets of Iranian retaliation. Saudi Arabia’s most important oil installations and most of its crucial water desalination plants are on the Gulf coast, within range of Iranian missiles. The Saudis are well aware that, as Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid wrote in National Security in Saudi Arabia, Iran could “launch asymmetric attacks in the gulf that would have a strategic effect out of proportion to the size and capability of its forces”—not to mention the effect of such a conflict on world oil markets.

The Saudis certainly would prefer that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons, but they do not believe Washington’s methods of trying to prevent such a development are constructive.

Moreover, several Saudis said they have to take the long view. President Bush will be gone in seven months, and the provocative Ahmedinejad might fail to win reelection next year. The Iranian people, however, have long memories. A policy of confrontation, even in the unlikely event that it succeeded in the short run, could inspire Iranian grievance that will last for a generation, making the Gulf region more difficult to manage than it already is. The Saudis fail to see how such an outcome would benefit them.

Shia Iran Versus Different Shades of Sunnism

Wed, 2 Jul 2008 16:49:34 -0400

Shia Iran is publicly unwavering in its commitment to forge unity among Muslim states. Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is again reaching out to Arab Salafists and Wahhabists and has declared the present Iranian year as the Year of National Unity and Islamic Solidarity. Sunni Saudi Arabia is also emphasizing dialogue. Two recent pan-Islamic conferences have been held in Tehran (May) and Mecca (June) to lessen intra-Muslim differences. However, neither conference produced concrete steps toward achieving this goal.

In May 2008, Tehran hosted 850 Muslim clerics (ulema) and intellectuals from 45 countries for the 21st annual Islamic Unity Conference. The Iranian conference organizers said they wanted to provide a forum for debate among different sects and to push for a charter on Islamic unity. A key facet would be the rejection of takfirism, a school of thought among hard-line Sunnis that considers Shiites as heretics and sanctions violence against them. According to Iran’s state-funded Press TV, the charter had already been signed by 2,000 Muslim scholars by the time of the conference.

Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Taskhiri, Iran’s Director-General of the World Forum for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, chaired the conference. No senior Salafi/Wahhabi clerics attended, although there were Arab Salafi participants from Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

At the conference on May 9, former Iranian President Rafsanjani – presently chairman of two of Iran’s most powerful political institutions- the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council - notably urged the Shia to rethink some of the sect’s beliefs and practices. “You can see how much Sunnis refer to the exaggerated statements in our books and traditions, and accordingly call us pagans,” and that unless “corrective measures are implemented the Sunnis will retain the opinion that Shias are apostates because they see their [Shia] imams as gods, which is not the case.” He also urged Shias to refrain from “insulting Prophet's [Mohammed] disciples, the four Caliphs and those who are regarded as saints by Sunnis”.

Curtailing unorthodox Shia traditions has been a constant feature of the theological debate in Iran since before the 1979 revolution. The matter has become more urgent in recent years due to the rise of Islamic mysticism in Iran, and the emerging reverence in some rural and poor urban communities of Imams Ali, Hussein or Hassan and Fatima al-Zahra, the Prophet’s daughter. A number of Iranian Shia clergy have spoken against such trends, warning that it effectively amounts to kufr (disbelief in Islam) since no human being should be worshipped in Islam.

The state views the religious practices of Islamic mystic Sufi sects as a challenge to the regime’s monopoly on religious authority, which underpins its political legitimacy. Iran has witnessed a number of government crackdowns on Sufi orders since February 2006, which seem to contradict their calls for Islamic unity.

Regardless of motive, Iranian pleas for Islamic unity made little impression on some of Saudi Arabia’s most senior Wahhabi clerics. Twenty-two of them issued an anti-Shia statement on June 1 in which they accused Shiites of abusing Sunnis under their control. "If they [Shiites] have a country, they humiliate and exert control in their rule over Sunnis," and specifically mentioned conditions in Iran and Iraq. "They sow strife, corruption and destruction among Muslims and destabilize security in Muslim countries ... such as Yemen." The tone of the letter is similar to the 2007 statement of Ayman Al-Zawahiri accusing Iranian Shia leaders to be “intent on establishing certain [Islamic] concepts which nullify the intellects of their followers and prevent them from understanding the Quran and Sunna, except through [Shia clergy’s] interpretations and explanations”.

The letter reflected a common sentiment among Saudi Wahhabis, but it was issued only three days before the opening of the inter-faith conference held by King Abdullah in Mecca June 4-7. Bringing together some 500 Islamic scholars and academics, the organizers hoped to present Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah to the West as forces of moderation in the Islamic world. Despite efforts by Saudi officials to distance themselves from the letter, the fact that Saudi Arabia’s indigenous Shia minority was officially banned from the Mecca conference lessened their credibility among the Shia.

Iranian media reported the ban and covered the arrest of eight Shia clergy and community elders in the Eastern Province but avoided any condemnation, perhaps in recognition of King Abdullah’s own struggle with radical Wahhabi clergy within the kingdom. Nonetheless, the intended political message in Mecca was clear. King Abdullah walked into the opening ceremony alongside Rafsanjani who then sat on the King's left, interpreted by Saudi media to mean that the Wahhabi kingdom does not have a problem with moderate Shiites.

The failure of these conferences to produce tangible plans toward Islamic unity is a reflection of the level of suspicion and doctrinal divide between the two main groups, exacerbated by their geo-political rivalry since 2003. Still, these recent Iranian and Saudi attempts should not be dismissed. Ayatollahs Khamenei and Rafsanjani, often deemed as fierce rivals, both judged the events sufficiently worthy to rally behind them. King Abdullah too has maintained the momentum for dialogue in his kingdom despite stiff opposition from some Wahhabi clerics.

For sure, political and not religious motives have been the primary catalysts in both instances. Both Iranian Shia and Saudi Wahhabi clerical establishments continue to contain dangerous sectarian voices that will prove stubborn in their views. Still, in an age when sectarian violence has almost become the norm in Middle Eastern arenas from Iraq to Lebanon and from Pakistan to Yemen, these two leading Shia and Sunni states can ill afford to let others take the initiative.

Israel's Sudden Flurry of Diplomacy is a Switch

Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:25:55 -0400

In short order, Israel has reached a truce with the radical Islamist group Hamas, acknowledged secretive negotiations with Syria, and declared a willingness to discuss peace with Lebanon. All this comes on top of regular meetings between Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors has been almost non-existent this decade. So why is all this happening now? And where is the United States, the traditional broker between Israel and the Arabs?

Three developments are driving this process. First, Olmert is facing serious political problems, including a corruption investigation over cash donations from a U.S. supporter. Olmert badly needs to change the headlines from the legal inquires swirling around him. He has now been in office more than two years and Israel’s unstable coalition governments rarely last longer than this. With his political career in jeopardy, Olmert’s best chance for extending his tenure is to ring up a diplomatic breakthrough.

Second, Israel’s military might has not proved decisive in recent confrontations. The Israeli Army largely quelled the Palestinian uprising that erupted in 2000. But Hamas, the most violent Palestinian group, only grew stronger politically. The same was true in Lebanon, where Israel waged war against Hezbollah during the summer of 2006, only to see Hezbollah emerge as a more potent political force. The Israeli public is weary of these inconclusive battles, and this has encouraged the Israeli leadership to seek compromises.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United States is preoccupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has been much less active elsewhere in the region, and has boycotted its adversaries. Israel and its Arab rivals have seen conditions deteriorate on several fronts, and have taken it upon themselves to act now, rather than wait for the United States to show greater interest.

Egypt brokered the truce between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, while Turkey has acted as the go-between for Israel and Syria. It’s too early to tell whether either initiative will produce any real breakthroughs. Odds are they won’t.

However, the developments do point to a significant shift in the Middle East. The United States sought to reshape the region after the September 11 attacks, but this has proved a mammoth undertaking with the outcome still uncertain. As the United States has bumped up against the limits of changes it can impose, regional actors have been more willing to step in.

Israel and Hamas have refused to deal directly with one another since Hamas’ founding two decades ago. But after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006 and seized full control of Gaza in the summer of 2007, some minimal contact became inescapable.

Israel controls Gaza’s borders, which means that everything going into the coastal territory, including food, fuel and medicine, has to be coordinated between the two sides. The Israeli restrictions made normal life impossible in Gaza, while Palestinian rocket fire out of Gaza made life unbearable for the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, the main target.

The solution was to work through Egypt. The Gaza truce could collapse at any time but it marks the first time Israel and Hamas have effectively negotiated an agreement. Regardless of what happens this time around, Egypt is likely to be called on to play a similar role in the future.

Israel and Syria had not held full-fledged negotiations since 2000, when the United States came close to brokering a deal. The Bush administration subsequently sought to isolate Syria and discouraged negotiations between the two sides. These positions were very much in line with the views held by Ariel Sharon, Israel’s prime minister from 2001 to 2006.

But Olmert has taken a very different approach. The Israeli air force bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor last September, an attack that risked unleashing widespread turmoil. Yet within months, the two countries began under-the-radar negotiations moderated by Turkey. Next month, Olmert and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad plan to attend a conference in France, raising the possibility of face-to-face talks between the leaders.

In Lebanon, the government has snubbed the Israeli overture, but Israel and Hezbollah have been engaged in indirect talks on a prisoner exchange.

The United States is still sponsoring the talks between Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Abbas. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has visited the region almost monthly since discussions were launched late last year. But the two sides have given no sign that they will reach an agreement, or even the outline of deal, before President Bush leaves office in January.

Bush’s successor will inherit a fluid Middle East where the rules are changing. Many of the parties that have been fighting this decade are now willing to talk, and they no longer see Washington as the exclusive mediator.

Pakistan Through the Lens of Iraq

Marvin G. Weinbaum and Edward P. Joseph — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:14:04 -0400

"There is no military solution in Iraq, only a political one." General David Petraeus's aphorism is about the only thing on which war proponents and opponents agree. The question is why so few American policy makers hold the same view about Pakistan.

As Pakistan's recently elected government negotiates a ceasefire with militants, Washington worries – with good reason – that the deal will simply give Pakistan's Taliban and their allies a free hand to launch attacks in neighbouring Afghanistan or plan the next 9/11-type attack on the United States. As General Petraeus takes over Central Command, which has military responsibility for 27 countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, America's options in Pakistan become much clearer when examined through the lens of the US experience in Iraq.

Like Iraq, Pakistan is undergoing tumultuous political change. In both countries' elections, Pakistani and Iraqi voters had to brave the threat of suicide bombings. But unlike Iraqis, Pakistanis did not go to the polls to advance sectarian or ethnic advantage, but to express a collective demand for democratic rule.

Across sectors, classes and ethnicities, Pakistanis swept President Pervez Musharraf's party out of power along with religious parties in the North West Frontier Province. In a stroke, Muslim voters in Pakistan rejected both extremism and the military means employed to fight it. Even as Pakistanis themselves, like Benazir Bhutto, fell victim to terrorists, opposition to the military campaign was universal.

The widespread perception was that US President George W. Bush's "war against terror" in Pakistan was ineffective, produced too many civilian casualties, and served to enrich and empower the military establishment. In the end, many Pakistanis concluded that it was America's fight, not theirs.

No one more than Petraeus appreciates the importance of a stable government able to win popular support for a counter-insurgency. But unlike in Iraq, the challenge facing the new government in Islamabad is not only to gain the confidence of the population in regions where terrorists operate, but to convince an entire country that counter-insurgency initiatives are necessary.

That task could now become more difficult with the fraying of Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani's coalition government as they work to reinstate the Supreme Court Justices. Political jockeying, unresolved constitutional issues – including the question of Musharraf's future – and a looming economic crisis already compete with the extremist threat for urgent attention.

The United States may soon lose patience with a democratic government less pliable than its predecessor and look again for a strong military hand to satisfy their concerns about al Qaeda and insurgency in Afghanistan. This would be a serious mistake. As in Iraq, the United States must shift its thinking to fully embrace democratic government as the foundation of any strategy for thwarting extremism and terrorism.

A clear lesson from Iraq is to separate motivation and capability. In Iraq, the tide began to turn not with the surge, but with "the Awakening" of Sunni tribesmen willing to cooperate with the United States in the fight against al Qaeda. In Pakistan, the motivational challenge is far more complex.

A secular Pashtun party is leading the effort to cultivate tribal leaders to adopt a pro-government stance in exchange for development and political reforms. Unlike in Iraq's al Anbar province, tribal leaders in Pakistan's border areas are not acting out of their own volition to fight an enemy, but simply being asked to stand down after bruising the country's military.

Given both tribal sympathies towards the Taliban – and fear of their ruthless tactics – it is doubtful whether development and political reforms will be incentives enough.

Like its Iraqi counterpart, the Pakistani army is severely limited in its capacity to wage counter-insurgency. But there is a major difference: it is far less clear in Pakistan who the military sees as its "enemy".
While its army's main intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), often cooperates with US intelligence, the ISI retains its ties with the Afghan Taliban and other anti-Kabul armed groups. These groups find sanctuary in Pakistan's border areas where they are viewed as strategic assets, despite their collaboration with al-Qaeda and Pakistan's tribal militants.

Sensing international fatigue at the flagging endeavour in Afghanistan, Islamabad eyes these militant groups, together with Pakistan's own patronised extremist organisations, as a "reserve force", providing Pakistan with a sphere of influence over its neighbour. In short, the Pakistani army wants little more than a military disengagement from tribal militias. With a part of the Pakistani security apparatus deeply intertwined with the Taliban and other militants linked to the wider network of terrorists, greater civilian rule that brings transparency and control over the intelligence services should be welcomed, not feared.

Accommodating Pakistan's tumultuous changes is among the greatest foreign policy challenges of the day. General Petraeus's new appointment is the occasion to look at Pakistan through the lens of Iraq. Instead of recoiling in anxiety, the way forward is to embrace Pakistan's democratic development and use it to advance American's urgent security goals.

Lebanon: Back on Track?

Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:04:03 -0400

The recent agreement in Doha to end Lebanon's 18-month political stalemate begins the process of re-establishing a functioning government and addressing the legitimate concerns of the Lebanese people. It postpones the discussion about the future role of Hizbullah in Lebanese society until after the election of the president, which brings us to the genius of this agreement: it separates the concerns of the Shi'a community from those of Hizbullah.

This is a crucial development because political equilibrium cannot be restored in Lebanon so long as these two issues are treated as one.

The Shi'a community was concerned with the failure of the Lebanese political system to provide adequate representation for the largest faction within Lebanon. Successful governance of Lebanon requires that the three largest confessional groups – Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi'a – have sufficient power within the government to protect their interests. For Lebanon to be governed, a consensus must be reached among these three groups, with each group's allocated political weight playing a determining role.

The redistribution of power that occurred at Taif in 1989 shifted influence from the Maronites to the Sunnis, while Shi'a concerns were left unaddressed. At that time, Hussein Husseini, a Shi'a leader, observed that Shi'a political rights were not protected by the Taif Agreement. He recognised achieving such protection was not then possible and that Shi'a concerns would have to be addressed in the future. They were not.

In November 2006, all Shi'a members of the Lebanese Cabinet submitted their resignations as an attempt to demonstrate their lack of confidence in the government. Thus, the essential consensus required for legitimate governance no longer existed. The Lebanese government chose to govern without Shi'a support.

Even though there were several reasons leading to the resignation of the Shi'a ministers, the government's decision reinforced the perception that Shi'a interests were not taken seriously. Thus, it became essential for the Shi'a community to prove that Lebanon could not be governed without their support. The past 18 months of political impasse has been the result.

The Doha agreement breaks this impasse and restores a governing consensus among Maronites, Sunni, and Shi'a. This objective was accomplished by forming a Cabinet in which the Shi'a and their allies have sufficient representation to assure that their interests are protected.

The second and most difficult accomplishment of the agreement was the drafting of a new election law to replace the Syrian-inspired one under which the current government had been elected. Revision of the law was essential to assure that a governing consensus was sustainable.

The accord achieved through the skilful facilitation of the government of Qatar and the Arab League has halted the sit-in demonstrations in downtown Beirut. Michel Suleiman was elected president on 25 May, and tranquillity is being restored in Lebanon. Political and economic conditions have the prospect of improving for the first time since the 2006 war with Israel.

However, the Hizbullah issue still needs to be addressed. While clearly intertwined with the concerns of the Shi'a community, Hizbullah presents a series of challenges well beyond the concerns of the Lebanese Shi'a. Few will deny that during the last 18 months the influence of Hizbullah increased.

That does not mean that the full array of Hizbullah actions and policies – which alienate much of the world – receive unanimous support among Lebanese Shi'a. They clearly do not. Nevertheless, in the scheme of Lebanese politics, so long as the Shi'a saw their security as being dependent upon Hizbullah, the community had no choice but to support them.

The Doha agreement begins the process of separating the well-being of the Shi'a community from support for Hizbullah. In the long run, this is the only way to confront the challenges posed by Hizbullah. As more and more Shi'a believe their community interests are protected by the government, and as more and more become less comfortable with Hizbullah policies, Hizbullah leadership will either begin to lose popular support or have to change their policies.

The challenge to this eventual reform is that in the short run many will see the recent Doha outcome as a victory for Hizbullah, which is likely to be given credit for the political changes. The objective must be to get beyond this initial perception and see the agreement for what it is: the first step toward establishing a more representative government in Lebanon, and in the long-term, diminishing the influence of radical groups.

Pakistan and the Gulf: Redefining Security

Thu, 12 Jun 2008 11:49:29 -0400

The newly elected government of Pakistan has clearly stated that it will review its domestic and foreign policies. Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, in an article published in The Washington Post on April 30, 2008 wrote, “Like newly elected governments in other democratic societies, we intend to set the tone and agenda. We want to show the world that our nation is back in business, with an overwhelming mandate from our people.” The new government presents increased economic opportunities and new avenues for many foreign investors. But as the title of the article suggests (“We Will Fight Terrorism – Our Way”), Pakistan will also alter its security agenda. The new government’s key focus, unlike that of General (ret.) Pervez Musharraf, will be on the countries of the Gulf.

During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan had close military and defense relations with most of the Gulf countries. A high point of Pakistani military involvement in the region came during the US led war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, when Pakistan sent more than 11 thousand troops to help secure Saudi Arabia. Millions of Pakistani expatriates were hosted by the Gulf and Pakistan’s economy thrived on their remittances. Over the years, there has also been considerable interaction between the ruling elite of Pakistan and countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who hosted Nawaz Sharif and the late Benazir Bhutto while in exile. However, there has not yet emerged strong evidence of a coherent foreign policy strategy towards these nations. Ever since September 11, Pakistan had all but ignored the Gulf States, relying solely on the Bush administration to meet its security needs. Many in Pakistan believe that this approach was misguided and that General Musharraf devised this policy to compensate for his lack of domestic legitimacy. By the time national elections were held on February 18, Pakistan was in shambles. Indicative of the grave economic crisis, food prices skyrocketed 20 percent in just one year (March 2007 – March 2008).

A New York Times report on November 5, 2007 pointed out that in spite of Musharraf’s failure to curb terrorism, “the United States has continued pumping money to the country,” but the distribution of this aid has been asymmetrical and the exact amount provided is not documented. In a study published in August 2007 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the estimated amount given to Musharraf administration is “at least $10 billion, since September 11, excluding covert funds.” Giving details, the study states that 60 percent of the funds were provided to the military while 15 percent were for the purchase of weapons systems. The Pakistani government received another 15 percent for budget support. The New York Times writes that a meager amount of 10 percent was reserved for much needed development or humanitarian aid.

In the present world order and the demands that it presents, security concerns for Pakistan do not necessarily mean extended ties in military terms. Indeed, there is a paradigm shift underway in Pakistan marked by a growing recognition that the country’s security lies in promoting the economic wellbeing of the people through poverty and unemployment reduction. Accordingly, Pakistan has to transform itself from a garrison state to a welfare society. The GCC states can contribute to this transformation, and there are encouraging signs that they have begun to do so.

According to the latest data from the State Bank of Pakistan, expatriates remitted $2.68 billion to Pakistan in the fiscal year July 2006 to June 2007. This is a 28 percent increase from the $2.06 billion in the previous fiscal year, with Saudi Arabia as the GCC country from which the largest proportion of remittances was sent. Members of the GCC have demonstrated their increasing eagerness to invest in major sectors such as energy, steel, real estate and telecommunications, although some critics argue there has to be more investment in the industrial, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors.

A report by the World Bank painted a dismal picture for Pakistan’s food shortage. It included Pakistan among a list of 35 nations that could face deadly riots. It further said that Pakistan lacked a widespread social assistance program targeting the poorest of the poor and that it needed immediate foreign assistance. In recent weeks, UAE companies like Al Ghurair Group, Emirates Investment Group, Effco from Sharjah and Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) Group showed interest in investing in Pakistan’s agriculture. Moreover, the Middle East – Pakistan Agriculture and Dairy Investment Forum pledged over $3 billion in new investments to Pakistan’s agricultural and dairy sectors. Efforts are also being made to increase current $31.1 billion investment from the UAE and trade of $5 billion to a much higher level. Pakistan needs help and Gulf investors are responding to the call.

In the ever-changing geopolitical landscape, Gulf States are concerned about Pakistan’s economic security and see Pakistan’s stability and its potential to confront extremist tendencies to be dependent in large part on its economic viability. Recognizing the importance of economic cooperation, both sides are seeking mutual incentives and prompt each other to develop in a direction that promotes peace and security at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

Iraq: Muqtada al-Sadr Still in the Game

Wayne White — Tue, 13 May 2008 11:02:32 -0400

Iraqi militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr remains a force to be reckoned with, regardless of his recent reverses. Unlike other militia leaders, he is more charismatic and has a large popular street following in locations extending from Baghdad through Iraq’s heavily populated Shi’a south. Ever since the surge, Sadr has been waiting out Washington, biding his time until the balance of political and street power is more to his liking.

To many outside observers, this seemingly moody and much maligned young cleric might seem a spent force in Iraqi politics, with his Mahdi Army worn down by lopsided combat with more capable US forces. However, those who have brokered the latest shaky ceasefire between the Mahdi Army on the one hand and Iraqi government and US forces on the other doubtless know better. Sadr has a powerful name and considerable charisma among Iraq’s Shi’a downtrodden. He also reportedly has been studying in Qom to burnish his clerical credentials.

Clumsy US counterinsurgency tactics in the early years of the Iraq War generated as many-—if not more--insurgent recruits as those fighters killed or captured. Likewise, in the recent fighting in Sadr City, during which US forces did much of the heavy lifting, numerous casualties among civilians and extensive property damage probably rallied many angry Shi’a to Sadr’s cause.

Sadr and his Mahdi Army may be the only Shi’a militia on the Iraqi scene with real street power. Following the example of other Islamist groups in the region, he is expanding that base by endeavoring to provide Iraqi Shi’a with some of the basic medical, educational and social services Iraq’s dysfunctional central government has been unable to deliver. Sadr certainly is not popular everywhere within Iraq’s majority Shi’a community, but has large followings in areas such as East Baghdad, al-Amarah, al-Kut, portions of Basrah, etc.

Many Iraqis, including poorer Shi’a, are tired of the violence associated with efforts by the Mahdi Army to secure control of additional areas and take on US and government forces, as well as abuses on the part of some Mahdi Army cadres. Yet, there have been no firm indications that his support base has weakened significantly. Indeed, to many Shi’a, Sadr’s fierce anti-Americanism and opposition to “occupation” still resonate very strongly.

Much has been made of Sadr’s acceptance of considerable support from Iran. However, Sadr’s principal rival, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his “Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council” (SIIC), which recently has cozied up to the government of Prime Minister Maliki and Washington, also receives assistance from Iran.

Unlike al-Hakim and many of his supporters however, the Sadr clan did not set up shop in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War or flee Iraq during the worst of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. They stayed and often defied Saddam, resulting in the murder of Muqtada’s influential father, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999, Muqtada’s two brothers, as well as his famous father-in-law in 1980. That, combined with Muqtada’s strong nationalist message, makes Sadr’s ties to Iran less controversial than otherwise might have been the case.

Muqtada al-Sadr also is his own man. In part for this very reason, Iran withheld support from him in 2003. Efforts to stereotype Sadr, especially among non-Iraqis, as an Iranian client who progressively can be peeled away from his Iraqi constituency reflect a profound misunderstanding and underestimation of Sadr’s overall clout in many quarters.

Sadr largely has been playing a waiting game since the beginning of the surge. His anti-American agenda apparently has not changed but he knows he currently is outmatched. Yet, neither the US nor the Maliki government can destroy Sadr’s power without removing the grievances of the many Shi’a who support him. Since the government has shown little ability to deliver, and one major grievance is the US occupation itself, Sadr—-or someone very much like Sadr if something should happen to him—probably will remain a robust fixture on the Iraqi political scene for some time to come.