The Middle East Institute -

Aitzaz Ahsan receives MEI award for "Courage in Defending the Rule of Law in Pakistan"

Fri, 21 Nov 2008 13:10:44 -0500

Banquet Address - MEI's 62nd Annual Conference

Fri, 21 Nov 2008 12:42:14 -0500

Banquet Introduction - MEI's 62nd Annual Conference

Fri, 21 Nov 2008 12:34:02 -0500

Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures

Omar Ashour — Thu, 20 Nov 2008 13:58:27 -0500

This Policy Brief analyzes the de-radicalization process of armed Islamists in Algeria. It investigates the causes of, and the conditions under which, the dismantlement of the armed wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), known as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), has taken place. That de-radicalization process was not limited to the AIS, but also included factions from the notorious Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and other smaller militias. The article concludes by highlighting comparative de-radicalization cases and providing a framework explaining the causes behind successful de-radicalization.

MEI SPECIAL VIEWPOINTS: “Architecture and Urbanism in the Middle East”

Wed, 19 Nov 2008 11:15:09 -0500

WASHINGTON, DC – The Middle East Institute announces a special edition of Viewpoints, “Architecture and Urbanism in the Middle East.” This wide-ranging mega-collection of essays, photographs and maps are flanked by pictures of centuries-old citadels and satellite images of urban growth. Together they create a facsimile of the Middle East's architectural past, present and future.

The special Viewpoints is available at: http://www.mideasti.org/publications/architecture-and-urbanism

Fifteen essays explore the social, political and economic influences of architectural development across the Levant, Maghreb and Persian Gulf. In a forward-looking approach, the essays suggest the need for a comprehensive urban development plan to foster and accommodate the socio-economic growth of the 21st century Middle East and North Africa.

Maintaining a delicate balance between tradition and modernity is a recurring theme. In one essay, Mina Marefat, an architect, urban designer and architectural historian, discusses Reza Shah's modernization efforts in pre-revolutionary Iran, “Reza Shah countered modernity with an indigenous past,” she notes, “Throughout Tehran, he replaced 19th century religious symbols with pre-Islamic iconography recalling the ancient Persian Empire.”

A rich architectural legacy influenced by a colonial past poses an intriguing challenge for the Middle Eastof how to create practical, innovative and sustainable architectural developments and urban environments while maintaining a sense of tradition.

Other contributors include Simon O'Meara, Brian McLaren, Nasser Rabbat, Annabel Jane Wharton, Rami Daher, Mohammad al-Asad, Mashary Al-Naim, Michele Lamprakos, Yasser Maghoub, Anas Al-Omaim, Yasser Elsheshtawy and Kevin Mitchell.

Since 1946, the Middle East Institute has been dedicated to increasing Americans’ knowledge and understanding of the region. MEI offers program activities, media outreach, language courses, scholars and an academic journal to help achieve its goals. For additional information please visit www.mideasti.org.

Architecture and Urbanism in the Middle East

Tue, 18 Nov 2008 13:29:40 -0500

MEI's special edition of Viewpoints on "Architecture and Urbanism in the Middle East" is an opportunity to celebrate the beauty, diversity, and vitality of the built environment of the region. It is also an opportunity to consider the challenges facing architects, designers, and developers in their efforts not only to preserve the rich cultural heritage of Middle Eastern cities but to shape these urban spaces in ways that address the physical and socioeconomic pressures occurring within them.

Indeed, as the contributors to this volume demonstrate, the Middle East's built environment is at an important juncture. There are major choices to be made if the region’s urban development is to meet the needs and expectations of its peoples. The 15 essays comprising this volume are snapshots of the built environment arcing from the Maghreb through the Levant to the Gulf.

Taken together, the essays suggest the need for a new paradigm of designing Middle Eastern urban spaces for sustainability — comprehensive in that it encompasses all physical components of human settlements such as buildings, streets, public spaces, and infrastructure; balanced in that it supports physical and economic growth while accommodating the traditional and cultural needs of the local community; responsive in that it protects and enhances the health, safety, and general well being of inhabitants; and innovative in that it incorporates new technologies into designs so as to reduce the stress on the natural environment.

Read Full Document (3.7m PDF)

Educators' New Tool: Indian Ocean Website

Tue, 18 Nov 2008 13:07:43 -0500

Washington, DC: The Sultan Qaboos Cultural Center (SQCC) announces the debut of an innovative educational website: The Indian Ocean in World History (www.sqcc.org/indianocean ).
The Indian Ocean is becoming an important topic in middle and high school world history and geography courses. But there are few instructional resources. SQCC’s new interactive site helps fill this gap throughout the US and elsewhere.

The Indian Ocean in World History contains colorful illustrations and explanations about the role of the Indian Ocean from prehistoric times to the present. It provides evidence of important human discoveries and endeavors before Vasco da Gama rounded Cape of Good Hope in 1497. Teachers and students will find the user-friendly, enjoyable website a valuable classroom resource that highlights a region situated at the cultural and commercial crossroads of the world.

Each website entry offers images of artifacts, quotes from original documents, maps and other historical data. A useful guide that accompanies the website lets teachers and students download sample lesson plans and worksheets as well as a glossary and primary source index.

“This was an incredibly thorough and well-thought out project from start to finish, “ says Daniel Cohen, Director of the Center for History and New Media at George Mason University in Virginia. “The site fills an important niche, both in terms of its topic and in the way it conceives of the interactions of a large region.”

The Indian Ocean in World History is produced by the Sultan Qaboos Cultural Center, a non-profit cultural center based in Washington, DC. SQCC is named after His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said of the Sultanate of Oman and is dedicated to educating the peoples of America, Oman and the Arabian Gulf in general about the richness of their cultures.

SQCC is a cultural arm of the Middle East Institute. For more than 60 years, the Middle East Institute has promoted respect and understanding between the peoples of the Middle East and America.

For more details about the website and SQCC, please email info@sqcc.org or call (202) 261 1690.

Don't Count On Gulf Oil Producers to Bail Us Out

Wendy J. Chamberlin and Zubair Iqbal — Mon, 17 Nov 2008 10:08:46 -0500

One of the more alarming characteristics of the global financial meltdown is that –well, it’s global. That makes it very difficult to know where to turn to for help. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown reckoned relief might be found in Riyadh. After returning from Beijing with empty pockets, Pakistani President Asif Zardari has also gone hat-in-hand to the Saudis. There are a number of reasons why troubled economies can’t count on the cash wealthy oil producers in the Gulf for a bailout.

The hard truth is that major oil producing states in the Gulf face liquidity shortages and for the same reasons others do. They are heavily invested in the very Western banks that are in trouble owing, partly, to the sub-prime rate housing collapse in the United States and Europe.

Western economic downturn further negatively impacted the Gulf oil producers because demand for oil is down. The rest of the world simply won’t be buying as much oil as last year. The latest IMF forecasts for the Gulf region show that the combined external current account surplus of the six states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to fall by at least 7 percentage points of GDP in 2009. This drop effectively wipes out the large bonus from oil sales in 2008 that helped fund ambitious projects in the Gulf.

There are other reasons for caution. Earlier wise decisions of several GCC countries to diversify their economies by building the tourism, real estate, financial services, transportation and other non-oil sectors will help cushion the sharp decline in fiscal surpluses caused by a fall in demand for oil. But these sectors also took a hit with the global downtown.

The slowdown in GCC countries will reverberate negatively throughout the region. Currently, Gulf oil producers assist the developing economies of their neighbors by providing subsidized oil and access to jobs for expatriate labor. Any slowdown will eliminate jobs for the armies of guest workers who now send billions of dollars home to countries like Pakistan, and the Philippines. Those emerging economies have become dependent on the remittances of overseas workers and the slow-down will compound the global recession.

Outlook for major oil producers is manageable. The oil producers, under current expectations; will have comfortable foreign exchange reserves. But if the exchange rates of Gulf currencies remain tied to the appreciating U.S. dollar, the authorities in the GCC countries will find it difficult to tighten monetary policy and may encounter continued high inflationary pressures. Political pressures may also build to increase government expenditures to stimulate domestic growth, and avoid unemployment pressures.

In any case, the current global crisis will make the path toward the planned monetary union by 2010 in the GCC more challenging. This is a shame because coordination of financial policies that will be called for by the monetary union to support a common exchange rate would also help reduce destabilization of cross border capital flows.

What should be done to address the gathering storm? The GCC States could consider three broad initiatives.

First, at the national level, further improving regulation and prudential supervision could strengthen domestic banking sectors. Countries in the GCC have already taken some steps in that direction and this should be applauded. But the current crisis offers the opportunity to push for further restructuring and consolidation of distressed banks in order to minimize domestic contagion. Of course, these steps should be undertaken in concert with similar initiatives at the global level.

Second, at the regional level, a more organized approach should be taken to aiding those distressed economies in neighboring developing economies that are most negatively impacted because of their dependence on economic support from Gulf States -- like Pakistan. Consideration should be given to establishing a trust fund made up of multilateral and regional lending agencies, selected GCC countries, and the G-7 to pool resources and facilitate their effective use by vulnerable counties under IMF/World bank guidance. Regional stability hinges on the lowest common denominator. It is in everybody’s interest to prevent economic implosion in Pakistan. A rescue plan could have the advantage of presenting an opportunity to force countries like Pakistan to come to grips with entrenched structural distortions in its economy.

Finally, at the global level, the cash surplus oil producing countries of the Gulf, although also weakened, can still help the way out of the global crisis. The GCC States should be encouraged to maintain a degree of fiscal expansion so as to stimulate demand in the world economy. Such a policy is not entirely without self-interest. It would have the positive effect of increasing demand for oil exports.

Changing Course and A Common Word: Two Important Initiatives for Bridging with the Muslim World

Thu, 13 Nov 2008 13:56:50 -0500

MEI was honored to host Abdallah Schleifer, Tom Dine and Rob Fersh for a discussion of two worthy initiatives that bridge the U.S. with the Muslim world—the U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project (USME) and the dialogue among Muslim and Christian religious leaders involved in A Common Word.

Iraq: Hanna Batutu & US Government Policy and Perceptions

Fri, 7 Nov 2008 12:39:14 -0500

•Hanna Batatu’s “Old Social Classes…” of 1978 formed the backdrop for much U.S. govt. analysis to follow, a reflection to a great degree of Batatu’s impact on the academic world. At a time when overall interest in modern Iraqi studies was amazingly low, Batatu’s study provided a fresh and invaluable baseline with useful insights throughout.

•However, there would be stunning departures in the direction of Iraqi affairs starting shortly thereafter, mainly stemming from an unexpectedly brash and aggressive Saddam Hussein.

•Further, the dramatic strengthening of Islamist tendencies throughout the Middle East dating from the late 1970’s would take Iraqi politics in a direction unforeseen only a few years before when secular, leftist parties and related movements still appeared dominant in many Arab countries.

•There were, however, many valuable, but often overlooked, warnings in Batatu’s work. In fact, in keeping with the spirit of this conference, I chose to use Batatu’s 1978 opus as my primary point of reference from which to assess some of the intelligence analysis within the U.S. government as well as some aspects of U.S. policymaking with respect to Iraq.

•Despite Iraq’s huge oil exports, mounting wealth, and rising military might back in the 1970’s, its radical foreign policy and location farther away from the Arab-Israeli arena marginalized Iraq somewhat and dampened interest (relative to subjects like Egypt, Lebanon, and various aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute).

•My first visit to the State Dept. Library as the Bureau of Intelligence & Research (INR) Iraq Analyst in 1979 was revealing. The library’s entire Iraq holdings took up about 4 feet of shelf space, with much of even that rather dated or anecdotal. By contrast, holdings back then on Arab-Israeli matters spanned about 100-120 feet of shelf space, with much of them frequently upgraded by newer acquisitions.

•The parlous state of intelligence coverage of Iraq in the U.S. government back in 1979 also was notable. I was asked to cover Iraq part-time, while spending most of my time as editor of INR’s flagship “Arab-Israeli Situation Report.” Even the far more personnel-rich CIA had only one full-time Iraq political analyst from 1979 through most of 1980. We became fast friends.

•To make matters worse, beginning during the Iran-Iraq War but increasing dramatically following the First Gulf War in 1991, less capable authors than Batatu hammered out many articles & books on Iraq, to some degree crowding out Batatu and some of his more able successors in the public domain.

•Worst of all, dozens of military documentaries of the 1991 War and the 2003 drive to Baghdad run by various TV networks led to an underestimation of the very real potential for robust & punishing Iraqi resistance if Iraqi combatants believe they have a decent chance of inflicting heavy losses on an enemy. Batatu himself notes the well-known combativeness of significant portions of the Iraqi population at several points in his 1978 classic.

•I saw this in the Iran-Iraq War, warned about it in an Assessment to policymakers in the first week of the 2003 War regarding the impending occupation of Sunni Arab areas farther north, and was essentially ignored. Even in late summer 2003, when the Intelligence Community began to craft a National Intelligence Estimate on the sources of violence and instability in Iraq, at first I was the only representative in the room who argued that we faced a growing insurgency.

•In fact, while on matters military, and, with respect to the current situation, it also is worth recalling Batatu’s superb account of the imbalances that led to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, and noting the potential danger today’s increasingly powerful Iraqi Army might pose to an Iraqi civilian government often dysfunctional at the local level, woefully corrupt, heavily influenced by exile parties, and more isolated from the populace at large. Indeed, only a massive work like Batatu’s drives home so graphically the full extent of the daunting overall challenge posed by Iraq’s complex politics and society.

•A core problem affecting U.S. intelligence analysis as well as the formulation of U.S. Iraq policy since 2003 has been an inability to grasp the full sweep of Iraq’s multi-dimensional societal matrix. Indeed, those bandying about the success of the surge and closely related developments as if they represent some magical key for profoundly and lastingly re-stabilizing a situation that remains, as the Pentagon said in Sept., in terms of progress, “fragile, uneven and reversible,” only reveal their lack of expertise.

•Certain basics have been widely ignored, such as the impact of the bombardment of anti-American teachings in Iraqi schools spanning two generations, the similar diet served up by the Iraqi and international Arabic media, as well as the reduced standing of the U.S. among Iraqis who, even before the events of 2003-2008, suffered under 12 years of largely US-driven UN sanctions.

•The authors of the war showed little interest in the vast guidance offered in the State Department’s “Future of Iraq Project,” convinced that a more simplistic, broad-brush effort guided by those possessed of some sort of greater vision but little expertise was best.

•Also at work in govt. is what I have dubbed “the bad news syndrome”: pro-active policymakers often are unreceptive toward pessimistic analysis from the Intelligence Community. Taking too lightly a gloomy mid-2004 National Intelligence Estimate on the prospects for governance in Iraq, the magnitude of the problem on that front was not fully appreciated by many policymakers.

•In assessing more critically Batatu’s 1978 work against subsequent events, I must note certain cautions. As with many great pioneers in their fields, it was impossible for him to benefit from much of what we know today. So I (or we) have the advantage of that proverbial 20/20 hindsight. It also should be noted that Batatu’s book, as can be gathered from its title, was not meant to be an all-encompassing history of modern Iraq.

•And Batatu in 1978 could never have imagined the roller-coaster of shattering events initiated by Saddam Hussein, and then the US, that would so alter the Iraqi political and social landscape with which he was so familiar. Batatu rather surprisingly characterized Saddam as “very reserved, and, on the whole, not prone to hasty judgments.” Nonetheless, the difference in behavior exhibited by an understudy and a ruler, as in say Anwar al-Sadat before and after the death of Nasser, can be quite dramatic.

•Well into 1980, the Intelligence Community’s assessment of Saddam remained close to Batatu’s, despite his bold 1979 coup, making almost all concerned too slow to conclude that Saddam was capable of starting a catastrophic war with Iran.

•Batatu’s heavy emphasis upon leftist political movements suggested to readers at the time that they would remain the dominant drivers of Iraq’s political culture well into the future. And the Ba’thist regime did endure until 2003, although shorn of some of its original ideological character and much of its élan. Yet, Batatu warned of this in the context of the work of Michael Aflaq, writing that even as of the 1960’s: “A Ba’thi would have looked in vain…for a singly objective analysis of any of the serious problems besetting Iraq…Instead of thought, he could find only vague slogans.”

•Batatu also appears to have underestimated the role of Islam in the future direction of Iraq. Such neglect was far more inexcusable among others covering Iraq beyond 1978 in the light of intervening regional trends, regardless of what the Ba’thist machine of control obscured from view and repressed. But until the Ba’thist veil was ripped aside in 2003, the Intelligence Community was working with only tiny bits of data, and most of its sources, the products of a more secular Baghdadi culture, reinforced the impression that Islamist tendencies in Iraq were not all that significant. Only INR polling in summer 2003 revealed the full extent of Islamist sentiment—even militancy—that had developed in Iraq under Saddam. Although anticipated among many Shi’a, we were taken aback when, for example, 40% of Sunni Arab Fallujans, asked about their preferred form of government, responded “Islamic Republic.”

•Moving on to Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divides, Kanan Makiya wrote back in 1989: The “hidden potential for…more violence in Iraq could at some point in the future make the Lebanese civil war look like a family outing gone slightly sour.” But such dire warnings were relatively few.

•Too many took away from Batatu’s work that urbanization, modernization, more secular governance, expanding military & professional classes, the emergence of the media, etc. had given at least Arab Iraq more of a shared Iraqi national identity. And Batatu did say the anti-British revolts of 1920 ushered in a process resulting in the “gradual…spasmodic growth of an Iraqi national community.” He also said that although many differences still persisted through the 1970’s, they existed “to a lesser degree.”

•But plenty of hard-pressed US intelligence personnel did not take the time to read Batatu’s book with sufficient care. With this in mind, it is worth noting that the quote above about the “growth of an Iraqi national community” was pulled from the introduction, the only section read completely by many in government.

•More to the point, even in the introduction, Batatu says that despite what was noted above, “the new national loyalty” remained “hazy, unacceptable to the Kurds, poorly assimilative of the Shi’is, and lacking the normative ethics, the warm intimacy, and the sustained emotional support…associated with the old loyalties.” So many simply took away from Batatu and other quality authors what they wanted, although Batatu himself did lean toward the notion of an emerging nationalism.

•Too many of us in government believed the oil-driven prosperity and burgeoning bureaucracy of the 1970’s had decisively drawn large numbers of Shi’a into the mainstream. Even many Shi’a with whom I spoke during my service in and many visits to Iraq during the 1980’s spoke of themselves precisely in this manner. Intelligence analysts and policymakers alike had even gotten the impression that the horrific Iran-Iraq War had functioned as an engine of unity of sorts among many Arab Iraqis fighting a common enemy, a view apparently also favored by Batatu at the time.

•However, most of us were only really tapping into those more secular Baghdadi middle and upper classes, not the Shi’a downtrodden of what is now Sadr City or the vast numbers of more conservative, less prosperous, and more alienated Shi’a beyond Baghdad.

•Despite the lack of a unifying nationalism, a profound resentment of foreign domination and exploitation does exist deep in the Iraq Arab psyche. INR polling even shortly after “liberation” confirmed this graphically, including a majority of Shi’a. As a result, it was incredible, especially this late in the game, that US policymakers put forward a bold, demanding first draft of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) dwarfing the hated and aborted Portsmouth Agreement of 1948 in its scope.

•Returning to societal fissures, they extend far beyond the ethno-sectarian paradigm. They involve regions, classes, factions within sectarian communities, certain key families, and tribes. Saddam’s policies during the tough times for his regime following the 1991 War altered Iraq’s tribal landscape as he turned to them for support, reversing a prolonged decline in tribal—especially shaikhly—power & influence.

•Frankly, the overall Iraqi internal equation became so fractured during 1991-2003 that it was near impossible for US policymakers to sort out ways of weakening or unseating Saddam in the midst of the wreckage left behind by so many years of his unusually brutish, incredibly destructive, and often communally-targeted misrule.

•Aside from launching an awfully foolish war, American policymakers quite often have been in a rather stunned & reactive mode in the face of the veritable roller coaster of events set in motion by various precipitate & catastrophic decisions made by Saddam, the ringmaster of Iraqi leadership folly since 1980.

•The impact of all that should give pause to any American policymakers (or politicians) who delude themselves into thinking there will not be millions of Iraqis, who suffered terribly in one way or another from events triggered by the 2003 War, who probably will look back upon the war and the “occupation” as an Iraqi Dark Age of sorts. Their country was devastated by war, looting, brutal, large-scale population displacement, rampant criminality, years of insurgent, militia (and American military) violence, al-Qaeda in Iraq terror—all of which killed well over 100,000 Iraqis (and maimed many more than that).

•To wrap up, even aside from, say, the disastrous 2002 WMD NIE (which really involved the WMD crowd, not Iraq experts), there were important occasions like September 22, 1980 and August 2, 1990 when shocked US policymakers received little warning from their Iraq experts in the Intelligence Community.

•Much genuinely useful council from the Intelligence Community was taken too lightly, but then there were those other times. Saddam Hussein quite simply broke the proverbial mold to such a degree that even analysts thoroughly grounded in Iraqi affairs and drawing from the efforts of scholars of Hanna Batatu’s standing could not guide policymakers adequately.

•Yet, as I have suggested before, no-one following Iraq up to 1978—inside or outside government—could possibly have imagined that Iraq would end up in the appalling state in which we find that great country today or could have predicted the awful trail of events that brought us to this sad juncture, whether that nation is now solidly re-stabilizing or not.

“Changing Course and A Common Word: Two Important Initiatives for Bridging with the Muslim World”

Abdallah Schleifer, Tom Dine & Rob Fersh — Thu, 6 Nov 2008 10:50:03 -0500

MEI is honored to host Abdallah Schleifer, Tom Dine and Rob Fersh to discuss two two worthy initiatives that bridge the U.S. with the Muslim world—the U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project (USME) and the dialogue among Muslim and Christian religious leaders involved in A Common Word. This event will be moderated by Wendy Chamberlin, President of the Middle East Institute.

Biographies

Thomas Dine
Principal, The Dine Group; former Executive Director, American Israel Public Affairs Committee
Washington, DC

Thomas Dine was Executive Director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Most recently he was Chief Executive Officer of the Jewish Community Federation of San Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin and Sonoma Counties. Previously he was President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Prague, a position he held for eight years. From 1993 to 1997, he served as the Assistant Administrator of Europe and Eurasia at USAID. Prior to these leadership posts, Dine worked as a foreign policy specialist in the U.S. Senate (1970 to 1980), was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and held three fellowships at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

S. Abdallah Schleifer
Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute (MEI). Distinguished Professor of Journalism, American University in Cairo; former Washington Bureau Chief, Al Arabiya news channel; former NBC News Cairo bureau chief

S. Abdallah Schleifer, Distinguished Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at the American University in Cairo (where he founded and served as the first director of the Kamal Adham Center for Journalism Training and Research), is a veteran journalist who has covered the Middle East for American and Arab media for more than 40 years. He served as NBC News bureau chief in Cairo, as an NBC news producer-reporter based in Beirut, as Middle East correspondent for Jeune Afrique, and as a special correspondent of the New York Times in Amman, Jordan and the Israeli-occupied territories. A frequent contributor of articles on mass media as well as Arab and Islamic affairs to scholarly and specialist journals, Prof. Schleifer is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, a Senior Fellow at the Royal Aal al Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought in Amman, Jordan, and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

Robert Fersh
U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project Co-Director and Executive Director, Search for Common Ground-USA
Washington,DC

Robert Fersh directs the U.S. division of Search for Common Ground, where his central focus is organizing and conducting policy consensus processes on issues of national importance. Most recently, he directed a project among key national stakeholders on Health Care Coverage for the Uninsured that concluded in 2007. Mr. Fersh has over 30 years experience in national public policy issues, having held senior positions in the Executive Branch, with three Congressional Committees, and as president of a leading national non-profit organization working to end hunger in the U.S. He holds an undergraduate degree in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University and a law degree from Boston University.

Registration for Winter 2008/2009 Classes is Now Open

Tue, 4 Nov 2008 15:17:36 -0500

"The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future"

Bruce Riedel — Tue, 4 Nov 2008 09:38:04 -0500

Author Bruce Riedel’s overarching theme was of al-Qaeda’s impact on America’s recent history. He emphasized also that some of the most wanted men in history, the leaders of the first truly global terrorist organization, have so far eluded the world’s top intelligence and military networks. Riedel attributed the United States’ failure to defeat al-Qaeda to its lack of understanding of the enemy. He suggested that the analogy of a multi-national corporation would best describe the structure and function of the terrorist group. According to Riedel, the hierarchical structure of al-Qaeda resembles a corporation with a CEO, Osama bin Laden, who, in collaboration with a board of directors, crafts a mission usually carried out by semi-independent, international franchises who have sworn allegiance to the parent company. Riedel explained that the operation has become successful in establishing franchises, both active and sleeper cells, throughout the Middle East and in Western Europe, and has developed a sophisticated propaganda machine to distribute its message to sympathizers and supporters.

Riedel said he was inspired to write the book, in part, to dispel enduring misconceptions about the links between the tragedy of September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda, and the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the belief that the attacks on September 11 were part of a broader Zionist conspiracy — a belief that spread through the Middle East. With "The Search for Al-Qaeda: Leadership, Ideology, and Future," Riedel said that he wanted to explain al-Qaeda’s message to a US audience by profiling the lives and interactions of its four most influential figures: Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

According to Riedel, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri created a historical narrative of the Islamic world which portrays it as under relentless attack from the West, as a means to justify and necessitate a jihadist response in the form of violent terror. At the symbolic heart of this conflict, Riedel explained, is the ‘Palestine Question:’ the creation and acceptance of Israel and the marginalization of the Palestinian people as the current manifestation of the Western attack and relentless persecution of Muslims. In this narrative, the goal of al-Qaeda, according to Riedel, is to ensnare the United States and Western powers in a quagmire of bleeding wars which will be psychologically defeating and economically catastrophic, eventually resulting in the West’s complete retreat from the Islamic world.

Riedel cited a message released in September 2007 in which bin Laden speculated on the bubble bursting in the US housing market. At the time he was mocked, but the prediction now rings painfully prophetic. He also bragged that for every dollar al-Qaeda had spent orchestrating terrorist attacks, the US had spent one million in its war in Iraq. Al-Qaeda’s confidence in this war of attrition strategy stems from its success against the former Soviet super power in the Afghanistan War of the 1980s. Riedel noted that the US is in the unique position of fighting in the same war from two different sides within the span of one generation, an experience that should not be neglected for its lessons on the futility of a purely military approach to this type of war.

Bruce Riedel concluded his remarks by stating that the mindless, nihilistic violence of al-Qaeda’s tactics has led to a backlash in the Muslim world: The majority of al-Qaeda’s victims has been Muslim, and al-Qaeda’s lack of vision for the future is largely uninspiring. Riedel affirmed that a military operation alone will not succeed against al-Qaeda and called for a new strategy that would engaged the Islamic world with the US (Riedel cited the recent declarations by Muslim leaders such as King ‘Abdullah II of Jordan condemning al-Qaeda as promising), utilize diplomacy as a first policy, including public diplomacy and economic aid, and increase intelligence operations to understand, deflate, and ultimately destroy al-Qaeda.

"The Search for al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future"

Wed, 29 Oct 2008 16:37:59 -0400

Several outstanding books have been written about the road to September 11. The Search for Al Qaeda has a different mission. While it does review how al Qaeda was created and developed, it focuses more closely on what has happened to the terrorist network since that awful day. According to Riedel, al Qaeda's ultimate goals are to drive America from the Muslim world (the ummah); to destroy Israel; and to create a jihadist caliphate along the lines of the Ottoman Empire at its height. The book reveals al Qaeda's multi-pronged strategy for accomplishing those goals; draw America into the type of "bleeding wars" that drove the Soviets from Afghanistan, build a safe haven for al Qaeda in Pakistan; develop other "franchises" in the Islamic world that can overthrow pro-American regimes; and conduct more Western attacks along the lines of 9-11 or the transit bombings in Madrid and London. Bruce Riedel is an expert on the Middle East and South Asia, with 30 years of policymaking experience in regional diplomacy and counterterrorism. He draws on this experience and firsthand knowledge in profiling the four most important figures in the al Qaeda movement: Osama bin Laden, its creator and charismatic leader: ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian co-leader of al Qaeda and its principal spokesman; Abu Musaib al Zarqawi, the tenacious leader of al Qaeda in Iraq until his death in 2006; and Mullah Omar, Taliban host to al Qaeda. These profiles provide the base from which Riedel delivers a much clearer understanding of al Qaeda and what must be done to counter it.

What Next for Palestinian Refugees: Gaza, the West Bank and Beyond?

Wed, 29 Oct 2008 16:27:03 -0400

Karen Koning AbuZayd was appointed Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in 2005. Since 2000, Mrs. AbuZayd helped oversee UNRWA social service, health, education and micro-enterprise programs that reach 4.6 million Palestinian refugees. Before joining UNRWA, Mrs. AbuZayd worked in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Sudan, Namibia, Sierra Leone and as Chef de Cabinet to High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. Prior to her 19 years of service at UNHCR, Mrs, AbuZayd lectured in Political Science and Islamic Studies at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda and Juba University in southern Sudan. Mrs. AbuZayd earned her B.Sc. from DePauw University in Indiana and her M.A. in Islamic Studies from McGill University in Canada.

How the New Arab Media Challenges the Arab Militaries: The Case of the War between Israel and Hizbullah in 2006

Assaf David and Oren Barak — Wed, 29 Oct 2008 14:49:22 -0400

Public criticism of the Arab militaries is as old as their military debacles. However, in recent years Arabs in the Middle East have begun to use the “New Arab Media” (satellite TV channels, the blogosphere, and Internet forums and chats) to speak their minds on sensitive issues, including the performance and roles of their militaries. Focusing on the debates waged in the New Arab Media during the Israel-Hizbullah War (July-August 2006), this Policy Brief shows how the conflict and its manifestations — most notably Hizbullah’s ability to withstand Israel’s massive military campaign for 34 days and launch unremitting salvos of rockets at Israel’s territory — opened the door for the harshest wave of public criticism of the Arab militaries in decades. As we demonstrate, Hizbullah’s ability to “resist” Israel, the regional power, not only enabled Arab observers to criticize the “passivity” and “helplessness” of the Arab militaries whether explicitly or implicitly but also prompted them to demand more transparency and accountability from their militaries — and, ultimately, from their regimes — and to call for a significant reduction in Arab military expenditures and for clear limitations on the militaries’ domestic roles. Our discussion also suggests that contrary to the widely held view among Middle East specialists, research on the Arab militaries, which play a critical role in the preservation of the partially democratic or non-democratic Arab regimes, is both feasible and worthwhile.

"What's Next for Palestinian Refugees: Gaza, the West Bank and Beyond?"

Karen AbuZayd — Wed, 29 Oct 2008 14:38:16 -0400

Karen AbuZayd differentiated the Palestinian refugee crisis from those created by other conflicts by pointing out the implications of the question: “What’s next?” In a typical conflict, she said, refugees suffer trauma and persecution but eventually may be presented with solutions to their plight: immigration to other countries, resettlement in their countries of origin, or return to their original homes. AbuZayd pointed out that Palestinians have suffered trauma for 60 years, so their thoughts on the question of “What's next?” are clouded by apprehension and distrust.

AbuZayd outlined the current situation in the West Bank and Gaza. In all, 4.6 million Palestinian refugees are registered with the United Nations (UN). Almost half of them (45.8 %) are under the age of 15. AbuZayd said Palestinian refugees have huge potential with a high literacy rate and drive for education, and UNWRA strives to utilize this potential by seeking to improve education standards, but it can only do so much. She further explained that UNRWA’s mission is to provide refugees with personal security and basic services like food, health care, and education, but it does not have the capabilities to provide for more complex, intangible human needs.

AbuZayd explained that more than anything else, the second Intifada has led to a degradation of the quality of life among the Palestinians and looming uncertainties about an end to the conflict. She further observed that peace negotiations have come and gone, but none have addressed the fundamental needs of the refugees. In recent years, the EU and countries in the region have played a more direct role, which she sees as being necessary to find a viable solution. In the meantime, she explained, territory available to refugees has been shrinking and the conflict has continued.

While stating that the UN tries to take an optimistic approach, AbuZayd also listed the uncertainties refugees face for the future. Although the ceasefire is still in place and Hamas and Fatah are reconciling, there continues to be threats of extremism as well as a strong military presence. She added that in the West Bank, settler violence, high unemployment, and restrictions on movement have taken a toll on the economy, and the consequences are incalculable. Likewise, in her view, the sealing off of Gaza has led to a sense of despair and economic desolation.

According to AbuZayd, these issues must be confronted in order to adequately address the refugee problem. Furthermore, she said the voices of the refugees themselves must be included in any future peace negotiations and urged the international community to do its part in moving toward a balanced reconciliation among the different parties to the conflict.

Pakistan Reaches out to Iran

Wed, 29 Oct 2008 11:16:49 -0400

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Pakistan only for a day but the issues discussed were much greater and wider than the time he spent in Islamabad. His arrival on October 10 came at a time when Pakistan is wrestling hard with its worst ever internal crises. Pakistan is under siege by militant forces, which are partly traceable. There is lot of confusion about the variance and agendas of these militant groups and importantly, who actually is responsible for the start of this huge mess. Parallel with the civil war situation is worst economic nightmare accompanied by chronic breakdown of electric power. To make matters worse, there is a serious and now persistent shortage of food, surprisingly in an agricultural country. All these facts combined convinced a collective 16 US intelligence agencies to file in their recent report that there is a danger of Pakistan becoming unstable and that the country is “on the edge”.

No big breakthrough was expected from these talks but a foundation has been laid for a future framework of relations. For the last nine years, Musharraf’s regime was hesitant to be seen closer to its western neighbour, as it followed the political, economic and security objectives of the hard liners in the Bush administration. The regional dynamics and their utility was a foregone conclusion for the Musharraf junta and even the Zardari government is slow to demonstrate a noticeable change from previous flawed policies.

The meeting between the Iranian officials and their counterparts was vital for Pakistan’s interests in various fields. Pakistan’s gas reserves are rapidly depleted to meet the needs of the growing population. It is more than an energy or economic problem - rather has become a concern for Pakistan’s national security. As the agenda of these talks suggest, the prime aim was to find ways for the early implementation of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, which has shrunk to Iran-Pakistan (IP) project. India dragged itself, raising objections under one pretext or the other. In reality, India started to show its lack of interest under the pressure of the U.S., with which a civilian-nuclear cooperation deal was signed in 2005.

The gas project was conceived in 1993 and was to carry 1.1-3.4 billion cubic feet per day (BCFD) from Pars field in Iran to Pakistan. It was agreed that Iran would bear the cost from Pars gas field to Jiwani to the Iran-Pakistan border. Pakistan will be responsible for its sides of the pipeline. This delay has already raised the cost of the project from $4.16 to $8.16 billion. If completed on time, this project will not only ease the energy crisis for household consumption but will help immensely with industrial development. For an immediate remedy to ease power shortage, at least in areas adjoining the common borders, the Iranian minister said to double the providing of electricity to Pakistan, i.e., from 1000MW (already agreed) to 2000 MW and to provide power generation units.

Pakistan was quick to request deferred payments to the Iranians on oil imports. The Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi remarked: “The Iranian foreign minister has assured us that Tehran will consider our request. If that is done and Pakistan gets this facility it would help stabilize the situation and ease the balance of payments”. Given the history of Musharraf’s not so friendly attitude towards Iran, this highly favorable request might have been bit difficult for the Iranians to digest. But then, both the countries can hope for a new beginning in the post-Musharraf era.

Ignoring Pakistan’s historic close ties with Iran and China, Musharraf’s junta pursued policies that were detrimental to the security interests of Pakistan’s otherwise trusted neighbors. In 2003 there were protests by the local people in Kharan, which borders Iran, against the presence of American combat troops in the Shamsi Airbase. Apart from those, more facilities at Jacobabad, Dalbandin and Pasni were provided. Although these were apparently for Afghanistan operations, it raised eyebrows in Iran and China. Both these countries suspected Pakistan to have become a partner in their “encirclement” by the U.S. Thus Pakistan became a villain in the strategic vision of both Iran and China.

In this regard, it is in Pakistan’s strategic interest to re-adjust the policies of Musharraf. Poorly educated and trained, the commando general had no concept of global-regional political and economic dynamics. Nor did he understand the benefits of dependable and lasting strategic partnerships. His dependence on a single power isolated Pakistan in the region, letting loose the bonds that took many decades to be built. The American troops will eventually leave the area, although Pakistan can continue its friendly relations with the U.S. Both Iran and China are going to stay right on the borders of Pakistan. That is the reason why during the talks, both sides decided to coordinate policies on the situation in Afghanistan and for that purpose the Pakistani Foreign Minister announced a to visit Tehran soon. What a shift in Pakistan’s policy?

It has to be understood that the world in shifting from uni-polar to multiple orders and already a debate to this effect has started in the American academic circles. There are indicators that various regional power centers will emerge in the near future based on economic viability and backed by political strengths. In other words, nations all around the world will be adjusting their preferences – moving within their regional groupings. It will be in Pakistan’s interest to reevaluate its policies in all seriousness and correct its course. A closer cooperation and coordination with Iran and China (without compromising its relations with the Americans) can bail Pakistan out of its chronic economic and strategic troubles.

Wrong Way in Pakistan

Mon, 27 Oct 2008 15:05:33 -0400

In its eagerness to reverse the mounting insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States has embarked on a policy course that could shatter our vital strategic partnership with Pakistan. By allowing American combat forces to freely conduct raids into Pakistani territory, a move that President Bush authorized in July, the United States intends to pressure Pakistani leaders to step up the fight against militants ensconced in the borderlands. But this policy threatens cooperation between the two countries, possibly to the breaking point.

Pakistani insurgents, initially staggered by the U.S. reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks, have rebuilt their organizations in the border regions; from those havens, they launch attacks against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. The 80,000 to 120,000 Pakistani troops that have engaged the insurgents since 2003 have been funded by the United States at a cost of $1 billion a year. Yet whether it is because troops are ill-equipped, poorly trained or unmotivated, operations have been inconsistent and incomplete.

As the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda have regrouped, Washington has come to question the sincerity of Pakistan's effort. U.S. officials, concerned that elements in Pakistan's security forces are sympathetic to the insurgents and more interested in protecting than pursuing them, understandably want to deal with the threat if Pakistan will not or cannot.

But there is too much at stake for the United States to risk dangerous, misguided policies. Neither intrusions by U.S. Special Forces nor missile attacks by drones will, by themselves, take out the thousands of insurgents and their allies along the frontier. They also cannot seriously disrupt the global terrorist network. No one proposes deploying the tens of thousands of U.S. troops that it would take to saturate the tribal region and sustain any successes. And fighting a united tribal nation on its turf would cause massive civilian casualties. Even a more covert U.S. approach, designed to play radicalized tribal groups against one another, would likely reveal that their hatred for America exceeds any historic or personal animosities.

So what is left? There simply are no quick fixes. The cooperation of the Pakistani military and its intelligence services, working with a civilian government, remains indispensable. At the moment, however, the Pakistani people offer no support; polls reveal that fewer than 20 percent of Pakistanis view the United States favorably. The U.S. invasion of Iraq galvanized their belief that, as in Afghanistan, the war was essentially about defeating Muslims. The United States alienated even our Pakistani friends by pursuing policies that came to be perceived as trying to salvage the presidency of Pervez Musharraf and thwart democratic processes.

While there is some comfort to be found in President Asif Ali Zardari's views on combating terrorism, having Zadari as Musharraf's replacement in the role of U.S. point man will not help to build a popular consensus against extremism. Just last week the Parliament voted unanimously to condemn the latest U.S. missile attack on Pakistani territory. If Zardari tries to blunt criticism of the United States, his governing coalition could be threatened. And the likely victor as prime minister in a new election, Nawaz Sharif, has a strongly jaundiced view of U.S. involvement in the frontier and Afghanistan.

Proposals geared toward helping the United States regain the trust of Pakistanis are under consideration. Most, like the Biden-Lugar bill, recognize the importance of nonmilitary assistance that addresses Pakistan's endemic social problems and infrastructure deficits. Measures that help Pakistan weather its economic crisis will have an effect, as will a more favorable trade policy, especially on textiles. The United States can also be more convincing in its commitment to civilian rule and democracy.

By contrast, openly violating Pakistan's territory will make matters worse. And Pakistan can easily retaliate. Most supplies for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan are delivered to the port of Karachi and then shipped by road to Afghanistan. Early last month, trucks seeking to cross the border were stopped, a warning of what might happen if U.S. raids continue. Pakistan's most senior military officer, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, has said the army will defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. Cross-border raids risk provoking direct confrontation between U.S. and Pakistani forces and could accelerate the growing dissension in military ranks over continued Pakistani alignment with the United States.

Terrorist sanctuaries are unacceptable. But eliminating them requires Pakistan's cooperation. The bombing of the Marriott in Islamabad last month was a reminder that we are fighting different faces of the same war. Continuing to carry out uninvited, inconclusive U.S. cross-border attacks will make finding cooperation with Pakistan more elusive.

MEI's 62nd Annual Conference November 21 “US Middle East Policy: Pathways to Renewal”

Mon, 27 Oct 2008 12:00:53 -0400

Middle East Officials and Dignitaries to Address Conference

Washington, DC (October 17, 2007) – The Middle East Institute holds its 62nd Annual Conference November 20-21, 2008 at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Prominent speakers will analyze the threats and challenges facing US policy toward the Middle East.

Anwar Mohammed Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of United Arab Emirates and US Senator Chuck Hagel will address the Annual Conference Welcome Banquet on Thursday, November 20 at 7 pm.

Zalmay Khalilzad, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations will deliver the keynote address to open the all-day conference on Friday, November 21 at 9 am.

The conference also features Aitzaz Ahsan, President of Pakistan's Supreme Court Bar Association who led last year's protests against the dismissal of the judiciary. He will look at the challenges facing democratic reforms in Pakistan. Nabil Ali Alyousuf, Director General of the Executive Office of the Ruler of Dubai and Nasser Al Saidi, Chief Economist of Dubai's International Financial Center Authority will focus on economic developments in the Gulf region.

Conference panels will focus on : What constitutes victory in Afghanistan and Pakistan; The future of US-Egyptian relations; Economic and political developments in the Gulf; and restoring America's credibility in the region. MEI brings together leading dignitaries, writers and authors from the Middle East, U and Europe who offer fresh voices to the debate over Middle East policies.

Panelists include Amer Awadh Al Rawas, Managing Director of Oman Mobile; Shuja Nawaz, Strategic analyst and author; Francis Ricciardone, former US Ambassador to Egypt; Ibrahim Helal, Deputy Managing Director of Al-Jazeera English; Bruce Riedel, of Brookings Institution ; David Ignatius, Washington Post columnist; Ron Suskind, Author and journalist; Peter Bergen of New America Foundation; Max Rodenback, The Economist's Chief Middle East Correspondent; Amr Hamzawy of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Graeme Bannerman, MEI Adjunct Scholar

For more information on panels and speakers:http://www.mideasti.org/conference/2008-annual-conference. Media admission is free. Please email name and affiliation to RSVP@mideasti.org For more details, contact MEI Communications 202-785-5336 or email: media@mideasti.org