Arab-Israeli Relations

What Next for Palestinian Refugees: Gaza, the West Bank and Beyond?

Wed, 29 Oct 2008 16:27:03 -0400

Karen Koning AbuZayd was appointed Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in 2005. Since 2000, Mrs. AbuZayd helped oversee UNRWA social service, health, education and micro-enterprise programs that reach 4.6 million Palestinian refugees. Before joining UNRWA, Mrs. AbuZayd worked in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Sudan, Namibia, Sierra Leone and as Chef de Cabinet to High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. Prior to her 19 years of service at UNHCR, Mrs, AbuZayd lectured in Political Science and Islamic Studies at Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda and Juba University in southern Sudan. Mrs. AbuZayd earned her B.Sc. from DePauw University in Indiana and her M.A. in Islamic Studies from McGill University in Canada.

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative

Mon, 6 Oct 2008 18:33:10 -0400

MEI and Foundation for Middle East Peace co sponsor a discussion with the leaders of the Jerusalem Old City Initiative, created to pursue creative governance and management options for Jerusalem's Old City.
Michael Bell, Professor of International Diplomacy at the University of Windsor, Canada, and former Canadian ambassador to Israel, Egypt and Jordan; John de Chastelain, former chief of Canada's Defence Staff, Ambassador to the United States and one of the three International Chairmen for the Northern Ireland Peace Process and Chairman of the Arms Decommissioning Commission; Marshall J. Breger, professor of law at the Columbus School of Law; Arthur Hughes, Adjunct Scholar at MEI and former Director General of the Egypt-Israel peacekeeping mission.

The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace

Wed, 23 Apr 2008 16:36:34 -0400

Middle East Institute & Israel Policy Forum are honored to co-host Aaron David Miller to discuss his new book "The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace." For nearly twenty years, Miller has played a central role in U.S. efforts to broker Arab-Israeli peace. His position as an advisor to presidents, secretaries of state, and national security advisors has given him a unique perspective on a problem that American leaders have wrestled with for more than half a century. Why has the world’s greatest superpower failed to broker, or impose, a solution in the Middle East? If a solution is possible, what would it take? And why after so many years of struggle and failure, with the entire region even more unsettled than ever, should Americans even care? Is Israel/Palestine really the “much too promised land”?

Jerusalem's Future: Chronic Conflict or a Shared Peace in a City of Three Faiths?

Wed, 27 Feb 2008 17:03:27 -0500

Danny Seidemann is an Israeli lawyer and legal counsel to Ir Amim, an Israeli NGO concerned with the future of Jerusalem. He is a leading expert on Jerusalem's municipal operations, planning, and residency rights. Ir Amim has been an invaluable resource for policy makers, diplomats and journalists. Seidemann has appeared frequently before the Supreme Court of Israel on Jerusalem-related issues.

Nazmi Jubeh, PhD, is the Co-Director of Riwaq Center for Architectural Conservation and a lecturer at Birzeit and al-Quds universities. A widely published expert in archeology, history, politics, and architecture, he has served on Palestinian negotiating teams and has advised the Palestinian Authority on Jerusalem and the Holy Sites. A graduate of Birzeit, he received a Masters degree from the University of Tubingen in Germany. Jubeh is a board member of several cultural institutions in Jerusalem.

Gregory Khalil, a Palestinian -American from San Diego, is a leading expert on the Israel-Palestine peace process and the Palestinian Christian community. Khalil, graduated from Yale and the Yale Law School, served from 2004 to 2008 as a member of the Negotiations Support Unit of the Palestinian Authority.

Israel's Kadima Contest

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 18:05:52 -0400

Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni narrowly won the Kadima party’s internal election this week to become chairwoman of Israel’s largest party and will replace Ehud Olmert within a few days. Olmert will remain as Prime Minister, however, until Livni succeeds in assembling a majority coalition in the Knesset. She has 42 days to accomplish that task; new elections will be called automatically if she fails, which would probably not be held until February at the earliest.

It should be noted that Livni won by only 1.1% of the vote ahead of her chief rival, former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. Hurt and angry in the wake of his narrow defeat, Mofaz has announced he is taking a “time out” from politics. This presumably means he will not lead an internal opposition to Livni but also might possibly erode her support in the center-right of the party and the country.

Livni has a good chance of putting together a coalition, but it is by no means assured. The second largest party, Labor, is headed by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has made no secret of his intense ambition to regain the post. However, he realizes that Labor is unlikely to gain in new elections held soon, so it will most likely join Kadima, as will the small left-Zionist Meretz party and the remnants of the new Pensioners party. All told, this only provides about 57 of the 61 votes needed for a majority.

Theoretically, there are two ways to get to the magic 61. One is to include some or all of the three “Arab parties”, which together have ten votes. This is highly unlikely, as Israel has never had a coalition including these parties and many Jewish Israelis might well consider it illegitimate. Additionally, although Livni is a dove in the larger Israeli political context, it is unlikely that they would be willing to endorse her security policies, i.e., the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

Livni’s background as a former hawk is very similar to Olmert’s, and her current views have followed the same trajectory as his. The one exception is that he still promises an agreement with the Palestinians before he leaves office and before Bush’s Jan. 1 deadline while she, like virtually everyone else, has apparently given that up. We may assume she will continue with the ongoing negotiations that she is already leading. These would include the same promises to give up most of the West Bank to a Palestinian state, and the same constraints not to immediately discuss Jerusalem or address the Palestinian demand to the “right of return”. The probability, at least until the end of the year, is a continuation of the current situation.

In the longer term, things will not be so smooth. Palestinian President Abbas’s term ends in January and there are indications that he will try to extend it for a year, although Hamas and others may not accept this. Also, Israel’s 6-month tahdiya (calming) with Hamas in Gaza is due to expire in December, and Hamas will almost certainly demand concessions to renew it. Perhaps most important, the entire Middle East is in a comparative political lull, almost certainly in anticipation of the election of the new US President and the start of his term.

Since a coalition with the three Arab parties is ruled out, Livni is left with the more likely alternative: a coalition including the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party Shas. They have twelve Knesset votes and are already a member of the current coalition. However, Shas is extremely unpopular with Israel’s secular population and has announced that it will demand considerable funding for its network of schools and other institutions in return for joining. There is also some speculation that they would be reluctant to support a female Prime Minister (the first since Golda Meir resigned in 1974). Shas is also moderately confident of its fate in new elections but cannot be sure it would be included in a government at that point.

If Livni fails to form a viable government and new elections are called next month, the probable winner would be the right-wing parties, especially Likud’s Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, who would be the likely new Prime Minister, barring unexpected developments (which are always possible). In any case, Olmert will remain Prime Minister until a new government is sworn in, probably in 6-7 months if a general election is held.

However, it is more likely that, following melodramatic negotiations, Livni will get her majority and will form a government. In that case, new general elections must be held within two years, most probably sometime in late 2009 or early 2010.

The old cliché of plus ca change, plus la meme chose is completely applicable here. It is improbable even if Livni forms her government that she will emerge as a strong leader in the mold of many of Israel’s earlier Prime Ministers. Rather, the divisions within Israel and the stalemate with the Palestinians both seem likely to continue.

For Americans concerned about Israelis and Palestinians however, the important question is: which of the current candidates for president is most likely to help the parties break the stalemate? Without constructive American help, more decades of stalemate and bloodshed may ensue.

Israel's Sudden Flurry of Diplomacy is a Switch

Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:25:55 -0400

In short order, Israel has reached a truce with the radical Islamist group Hamas, acknowledged secretive negotiations with Syria, and declared a willingness to discuss peace with Lebanon. All this comes on top of regular meetings between Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors has been almost non-existent this decade. So why is all this happening now? And where is the United States, the traditional broker between Israel and the Arabs?

Three developments are driving this process. First, Olmert is facing serious political problems, including a corruption investigation over cash donations from a U.S. supporter. Olmert badly needs to change the headlines from the legal inquires swirling around him. He has now been in office more than two years and Israel’s unstable coalition governments rarely last longer than this. With his political career in jeopardy, Olmert’s best chance for extending his tenure is to ring up a diplomatic breakthrough.

Second, Israel’s military might has not proved decisive in recent confrontations. The Israeli Army largely quelled the Palestinian uprising that erupted in 2000. But Hamas, the most violent Palestinian group, only grew stronger politically. The same was true in Lebanon, where Israel waged war against Hezbollah during the summer of 2006, only to see Hezbollah emerge as a more potent political force. The Israeli public is weary of these inconclusive battles, and this has encouraged the Israeli leadership to seek compromises.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United States is preoccupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has been much less active elsewhere in the region, and has boycotted its adversaries. Israel and its Arab rivals have seen conditions deteriorate on several fronts, and have taken it upon themselves to act now, rather than wait for the United States to show greater interest.

Egypt brokered the truce between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, while Turkey has acted as the go-between for Israel and Syria. It’s too early to tell whether either initiative will produce any real breakthroughs. Odds are they won’t.

However, the developments do point to a significant shift in the Middle East. The United States sought to reshape the region after the September 11 attacks, but this has proved a mammoth undertaking with the outcome still uncertain. As the United States has bumped up against the limits of changes it can impose, regional actors have been more willing to step in.

Israel and Hamas have refused to deal directly with one another since Hamas’ founding two decades ago. But after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006 and seized full control of Gaza in the summer of 2007, some minimal contact became inescapable.

Israel controls Gaza’s borders, which means that everything going into the coastal territory, including food, fuel and medicine, has to be coordinated between the two sides. The Israeli restrictions made normal life impossible in Gaza, while Palestinian rocket fire out of Gaza made life unbearable for the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, the main target.

The solution was to work through Egypt. The Gaza truce could collapse at any time but it marks the first time Israel and Hamas have effectively negotiated an agreement. Regardless of what happens this time around, Egypt is likely to be called on to play a similar role in the future.

Israel and Syria had not held full-fledged negotiations since 2000, when the United States came close to brokering a deal. The Bush administration subsequently sought to isolate Syria and discouraged negotiations between the two sides. These positions were very much in line with the views held by Ariel Sharon, Israel’s prime minister from 2001 to 2006.

But Olmert has taken a very different approach. The Israeli air force bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor last September, an attack that risked unleashing widespread turmoil. Yet within months, the two countries began under-the-radar negotiations moderated by Turkey. Next month, Olmert and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad plan to attend a conference in France, raising the possibility of face-to-face talks between the leaders.

In Lebanon, the government has snubbed the Israeli overture, but Israel and Hezbollah have been engaged in indirect talks on a prisoner exchange.

The United States is still sponsoring the talks between Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Abbas. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has visited the region almost monthly since discussions were launched late last year. But the two sides have given no sign that they will reach an agreement, or even the outline of deal, before President Bush leaves office in January.

Bush’s successor will inherit a fluid Middle East where the rules are changing. Many of the parties that have been fighting this decade are now willing to talk, and they no longer see Washington as the exclusive mediator.

Egypt's Quandary Over the Gaza Border

Wed, 30 Jan 2008 13:34:32 -0500

The breach of the border barrier along the Gaza-Egyptian border presents Egypt with a major quandary. Egypt is caught between several fires, mostly not of its own making, and with few good options clearly available. President Husni Mubarak has made a virtue of necessity by indicating he welcomed the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into Sinai, but in fact this prospect has long raised major concerns in Egypt about the potential of chaos in Gaza. Egypt would prefer to revert to the status quo, but Hamas is eager to see an open border point at Rafah. The Palestinian Authority government of Mahmud ‘Abbas would like to use the border issue as leverage to regain influence in Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, is making sounds about getting out of the business of supplying electricity in Gaza now that “the border is open” with Egypt. And because of the likelihood of criticism from other Arab states, Egypt cannot be very open about its fundamental concerns.

Consider this: some press reports and the United Nations have suggested that as many as 700,000 Palestinians entered Egypt from Gaza in the first days after the border break-through. Even if that number is a gross exaggeration, 1.5 million people crowded into the 350 square kilometers of the Gaza strip outnumber the entire population of the Sinai Peninsula -- about half a million scattered over 60,000 square kilometers. Half a million or more Palestinians pouring into northeastern Sinai could easily overwhelm the limited population of northeastern Sinai.

Egypt’s ability to constrain is limited in part by the shortage of security forces. Egyptian regular military forces are banned from the eastern Sinai (“Area C”) under the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The exception is an amendment agreed by the Israeli Knesset in 2005 to allow 750 Egyptian border guards (not regular Army) along the border once Israel withdrew completely from Gaza. There are reports that Egypt sent an additional 5,000 border guards in 2006, in part in response to Israeli complaints about arms smuggling and smuggling tunnels along the border.

Egypt is still prohibited from using its regular armed forces in any strength in eastern Sinai but the Egyptians are seriously concerned about: Egyptian’s view of Hamas. While Egypt has at times sought to facilitate negotiations between Hamas and Fatah, it has undeniably seen the Hamas takeover of Gaza last June as a potential threat. Hamas, after all, evolved directly out of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, itself was originally founded under the tutelage of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The Egyptian government sees the Brotherhood as its most potent domestic threat. It is no coincidence that Egypt’s chief negotiator with Israel and the Palestinian Authority on security affairs is General Omar Suleiman, the country’s Director of General Intelligence.

The flood of pro-Hamas Palestinians into northern Sinai is likely interpreted by the Egyptian security establishment as a direct threat to Egypt’s internal security. The demographic facts on the ground reinforce this. The shortage of security forces undermines the security forces’ ability to respond. When Hamas took over last year in Gaza, Egypt closed the border (Israel also closed its border crossing points to Egypt) and has characterized the Hamas takeover as an illegitimate coup. Although Egypt kept the border closed, the wall had been built by the Israelis before their withdrawal.

Egypt also is clearly worried about the Israeli effort to shift responsibility for Gaza Egypt, of course has many connections to Gaza. Under the terms of the armistice after the 1948 war Egypt administered Gaza from 1948 until 1967. Unlike Jordan, which annexed the West Bank, Egypt never claimed Gaza as part of Egypt and in fact kept it under a military governor until the 1967 war, with Gaza residents not readily permitted to enter Egypt. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, a number of personal and institutional ties across the border were resumed. But the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty affirmed that Egypt made no territorial claims beyond the international frontier. In fact, Egypt basically refused to consider any resumption of Egyptian Administration there precisely because of the demographic makeup of Gaza.

Israel was not that eager to remain in Gaza either: it promoted a “Gaza first” approach in the Oslo talks and, of course, withdrew its forces completely from Gaza in 2005. But there are some signs that Israel is leaning towards pressing Egypt to take responsibility for Gaza, something the Egyptians see as a disastrous course.

Immediately after the breach in the border took place, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai, a former general and member of the Labor Party, (Party leader Ehud Barak, is the defense minister), publicly suggested that now that the border with Egypt was open, Israel should get out of the role of supplying Gaza altogether. He told Army Radio that the disengagement process begun in 2005 “continues in that we want to stop supplying electricity to them, stop supplying them with water and medicine, so that it would come from another place. We are responsible for it as long as there is no alternative.”

Egypt rejected Vilnai’s remarks but there are few solutions to the present quandary that do not leave Egypt in a more awkward position. An open border at Rafah raises serious security concerns in Sinai. A closed border guarantees that Egypt will be portrayed as allied with Israel to besiege Gaza. A deal with the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas, to take over the border crossing raises huge problems of implementation.

If Egypt accepts more responsibility for Gaza along the lines Vilnai has suggested, Israel could hold it responsible for the next round of Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli towns. And yet the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty prohibits Egypt from moving major military forces in to enforce order. This surely is not a choice Egypt wants.

"Lake Success" and Annapolis: Completing the circle?

Mon, 17 Dec 2007 11:05:05 -0500

November 29, 2007 marked the 60th anniversary of the United Nations vote to partition the British mandate of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab. Jews called it "The Miracle of Lake Success" (the location of UN headquarters at the time) while Arabs called it illegal and a betrayal of Palestine's Arab inhabitants.

The anniversary coincided with the Annapolis meeting that has restarted Israeli and Palestinian peace negotiations after seven bleak and violent years. Though presumably unintentional, the coincidence highlights the long history of seemingly indispensable international efforts to settle the conflict. Unknown at this point is whether Annapolis represents a new beginning or simply a political show.

Looking at the international framework gives cause for hope. In 1947, the Arab countries were vociferously and unanimously against partition, and for decades maintained their steadfast opposition to Israel's existence. This year, in contrast, most of the Arab countries attended Annapolis, demonstrating desire for peace. They all approved the Arab League Initiative, adopted in 2002, and reconfirmed in 2007, which promises a consensual resolution of the issue of Palestinian refugees and peace and normalization with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal to the boundaries of 1967—boundaries establishing a considerably larger Israel than those the Arabs previously rejected in 1947.

The biggest stumbling block ahead continues to be the suspicion built up over six decades of violence. Palestinians are convinced that Israelis have no intention of terminating their presence in the West Bank and Gaza, and ending Israeli control of Palestinian lives and land. Palestinians insist they will not make peace without East Jerusalem as their capital, an issue that arouses deep-seated religious emotions on all sides.

Israelis find it very difficult to forget the day after their declared independence in 1948 when five Arab countries sent troops into Palestine/Israel. Although Israel managed to defeat them easily, the fear of annihilation lingers. These fears are further buttressed by memories of the 1967 war, when even larger forces were arrayed against them. Suicide bombers, although far less common than a few years ago, continue to convince Israelis that Palestinians are still bent on their annihilation. Israelis want guarantees of security, perhaps beyond the capacity of anyone to provide.

Above all, Israelis and Palestinians need mutual recognition and affirmed legitimacy. Israelis are convinced that the Arab world, even if it promises peace, does not really accept a Jewish state in its midst. Even though 70% of Israelis tell pollsters that they would accept a Palestinian state, polls show that Palestinians cannot imagine Israel ever giving up control of Palestinian lives. In a symmetry that would be amusing were it not tragic, polls show that Palestinians possess a similar willingness to accept the other side, but cannot believe they themselves would be accepted. Both sides are convinced that they are the victims, that it would be so easy for the "other" side to grant what they feel they need, and that the compromises they are asked to make are unendurable given what they have suffered.

Many took from the failure of the Oslo Process an experience that good intentions were defeated and betrayed by the other side. That historical "memory" is a major obstacle to peace within both societies.

However, history can also provide another, more optimistic, perspective. It is worth recalling that it would have been unimaginable in 1947 for a Palestinian and an Israeli leader to repeatedly proclaim their joint desire for peace.

Unlike 1947, or even 1993, when the Oslo Declaration of Principles was signed, the pieces for sustainable peace are on the table, just waiting for the statesmen to assemble them into a viable framework: a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries and a sharing of Jerusalem; 1:1 land swaps for settlement territories; security for Israelis guaranteed by working Palestinian civil and military institutions; and resettlement of refugees in a Palestinian state or elsewhere with some compensation. These are the most likely contours of peace. As the saying goes, it's not rocket science.

What Annapolis made noteworthy, in vivid contrast to past efforts, is that the current Palestinian and Israeli leaders are not only willing to go further for peace than any of their predecessors, but have staked their political futures on it. In addition, the leadership of the Arab world and even much of the Muslim world has weighed in on the side of a consensual settlement. This is unprecedented, and should be recognized as such.

With most of the world's leadership now actively supporting peace, the peace forces within the two societies now face a major challenge: to re-ignite the people's faith that a two-state solution can result from the Annapolis process within the next year, not in an undefined future.

Annapolis Talks: Big Plans for Weak Leaders

Wed, 21 Nov 2007 16:07:14 -0500

Here’s the sad irony of the coming Israeli-Palestinian conclave: if Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas were locked in a room and left to their own devices, they would be quite capable of real progress on some of the thorniest Middle East problems.

Both leaders are willing negotiators and desperately need some sort of breakthrough, no matter how modest, to boost their sagging political standing at home. Yet Olmert and Abbas are so weak among their own constituencies that any promises they make at the talks in Annapolis, Maryland, will immediately raise questions about their ability to deliver.

When Olmert campaigned for his post in the spring of 2006, he told Israeli voters he wanted to set Israel’s permanent borders, which would mean giving up many West Bank settlements. But his coalition government has never gained traction, and a skeptical Israeli public is in no mood to consider major concessions to the Palestinians.

A few years back, Abbas was one of the first prominent Palestinian politicians to publicly criticize violence against Israel, saying the attacks were counterproductive and undermined Palestinian efforts to achieve statehood. Yet he has no control in the Gaza Strip, the source of persistent Palestinian rocket fire. Mr. Abbas has been powerless in Gaza since his Fatah movement was defeated by the radical Islamic group Hamas in fighting last June.

President Bush is speaking loftily of establishing a Palestinian state before the end of his term in January 2009. But after years of daily violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it has taken a major diplomatic push just to get the leaders to meet face-to-face.

The metric for success at the Annapolis conference should be modest: Can the Israeli and Palestinian leaders start working together on a range of problems, including the crisis in the Gaza Strip?

Olmert and Abbas, along with the United States, share an interest in pressuring Hamas. But punishing Hamas has meant squeezing Gaza and making normal life impossible for the territory’s 1.5 million residents.

If Olmert wants to help Abbas, then Israel will have to allow Palestinian people and goods to move more freely, in both Gaza and the West Bank. If Abbas wants to help Olmert, he will have to crack down on Palestinian militants, relying on the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank and on his powers of persuasion in Gaza.

Hamas, which will not be at Annapolis, is rooting for the conference to fail, and could have much to cheer about. Hamas believes that Abbas will have little to show for this visit, buttressing the group’s argument that negotiating with Israel is futile.

If Abbas goes home empty-handed, he could face increasing Palestinian pressure to resume a dialogue with Hamas in hopes of mending the fracture between the two main Palestinian factions.

In one example of how bizarre life has become in Gaza, Abbas does not want Palestinian security force members there to cooperate with the Hamas leadership.

So Abbas is paying the vast majority of the security force members in Gaza not to work, according to Safwat al-Kahlout, a Palestinian journalist who runs the Gaza News Service. Hamas, in turn, is paying a small minority of security force members who support Hamas.

When President Bush came into office, he viewed Bill Clinton’s intensive Middle East peace efforts a failure and has largely kept his distance. The periodic diplomatic pushes have been short-lived,
and it’s difficult to see how this one will fare better.

The most ambitious venture was the Road Map in 2003, with its detailed timetable for negotiations. It flopped immediately.

US diplomacy was stepped up briefly in 2005 when Israel withdrew its settlers from Gaza, raising hopes that the Palestinians would focus on nation-building in the coastal territory. But Gaza descended into ever more chaos, and the “Gaza First” plan quickly collapsed.

Today, the Bush administration is looking to prop up Abbas in what amounts to a “West Bank First” policy. Yet the timing of the Annapolis talks feels artificial and forced, motivated by an administration trying to show it is doing something, no matter how long the odds.

For all its good intentions, the Annapolis meeting is a stark illustration of how much time has been wasted and how much ground has been lost during seven long years of violence.

Jerusalem: Whose Capital?

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Mon, 10 Sep 2007 13:15:35 -0400

On August 11, the New York Times published an article by Stephen Erlanger on the divided road the Israelis are building around Jerusalem. This road combines two roads - one for the Palestinians to be able to move from the Northern West Bank to the Southern West Bank and back - and one for the Israelis. A high wall separates the roads. For the Israelis, there are a number of exits that allow travelers to go into Jerusalem or down into the Jordan Valley. For the Palestinians, there are no exits except at the terminal points. The road is not news, nor is the concept. It is, instead the fulfillment of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s vision of the future for the Palestinian entities in Judea and Samaria. The US administration has always thought that there had to be real territorial unity between the Northern and Southern parts of the West Bank and that the Palestinian State had to have a presence in Jerusalem.

But Sharon never saw the West Bank as one contiguous Palestinian entity that could form the basis of a State. He spoke of the contiguity of movement - not territory. His vision was of a series of tunnels and restricted access roads that would tie the various Palestinian parcels of land together. Meanwhile, Israel would dominate the high points and strategic crossing points to ensure Israel’s security in the future. Sharon, who drove the settlement process, placed these Israeli outposts as a guarantee against the possibility of a terrorist dominated Palestinian entity and invasion from the East.

Sharon never contemplated giving up Jerusalem either. The new divided road physically isolates Palestinians neighborhoods of Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. From the earliest days, in 1980, during autonomy negotiations Sharon made it clear he wanted to start with the Jerusalem question because once the Palestinians accepted Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, he believed it would be relatively easy to reach a settlement of other issues. He never answered the question of how we were to get the Palestinians, let alone the Islamic world, to agree to such a solution.

The settlements that Israel has built around Jerusalem are in reality mini cities and permanent fixtures. Their imposing presence convinced both Presidents Clinton and Bush that the Palestinians would have to accept the facts on the ground. And that very acceptance has pointed the way for Israel’s political leadership toward constructing - literally - a unilateral final resolution of the Jerusalem question. There is still some more building to do to fill in the gaps that exist, but I have little doubt that in ten years time Arab parts of Jerusalem will be merely an isolated island in the middle of a sprawling Israeli city.

This story has a long history. In the 1960s Israel was establishing settlements in the Jordan valley as military outposts, designed to pin down the border with Jordan and to secure the heights against future attack from the East. Gradually they metamorphosed into civilian settlements.

From that point on, the US has watched and done nothing as the Israelis have built hundreds of settlements all over the West Bank in violation of earlier peace agreements. We have been particularly passive when it comes to Jerusalem. Once in a while we have protested or sent our Ambassadors in to complain, but the Israelis know full well that we are not going to press the point. It has always been inconvenient to press the Israelis on what was seen as the secondary question of the settlements when the more important issue of a final peace agreement was at stake. And yet it is this very secondary question that has gradually excluded an increasingly large area of Palestinian land from any possible agreement and may put the possibility of any final agreement out of reach forever.

How could a Palestinian agree to a settlement that did not have Jerusalem as an integral component? Yet I have not yet seen a US administration that has the political will to stop the permanent acquisition of Jerusalem as the undivided eternal capital of Israel. The Israelis know very well that when the issue is Jerusalem, Congress will go their way and the President will not be far behind. Objections based on the impact on our interests in the region will melt away in the glow of American politics. It is not inevitable, but it is certainly possible if we do not address now Palestinian statehood and an Arab stake in Jerusalem.