Democratization

The Future of Democracy in Lebanon

Tue, 22 Jul 2008 15:18:43 -0400

Political and sectarian struggles have long plagued Lebanon, a country that seems to be perpetually steeped in crisis. From the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 to the forced deadlock of the Lebanese government by Hezbollah in 2006, democracy in Lebanon seems to be a constant struggle in a delicate balance of power. Even with the recent turn of events and the election of a president, many questions remain for the future of governance in Lebanon. What will it take to overcome governmental crises and sectarian differences? Is democracy sustainable in the divided society? Riad al-Khouri and Graeme Bannerman addressed these issues in a discussion of the "Future of Democracy in Lebanon."

President Zardari - Hope or Despair?

Wed, 24 Sep 2008 11:09:37 -0400

Asif Ali Zardari was voted President of Pakistan by an overwhelming majority, just as the post February election alignment had projected. In the national and provincial elections, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) emerged as the single largest party in the National Assembly and did well in all of the four provinces, especially in Sindh. Taking advantage of its strength, the co-chairman of the PPP was able to maneuver a majority in Baluchistan and a coalition in the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab. At present, with the exception of Punjab, it is a partner in the government in all the political arrangements of Pakistan. Many analysts give credit for this success to Zardari, citing his political “wisdom and skills”. Others agree that his rise to power would not have been possible without compromises made with Musharraf and other actors of the establishment. Whatever the reality, Zardari is in charge of the political landscape of Pakistan, with enormous powers provided by a distorted constitution from the rule of General Musharraf.

Article 41 of the 1973 Constitution regards the president as a symbol of the federation of Pakistan. Thus, the president is expected to be above political divides. The constitution in its original form provides a parliamentary form of government so the real power rests with the prime minister and the national parliament. In the past, the three presidents, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar steered clear of the internal political agendas of their political parties. The founding fathers of Pakistan visualized a parliamentary democracy. That should be the only objective of the current political actors.

Regardless of the debate about whether or not real power rests in the office of the prime minister and the parliament, the three branches of government – executive, legislature and judiciary must operate on the basis of checks and balances in order for a healthy political process to function. With the election of Asif Ali Zardari, the balance shifts heavily in favor of the president, thus compromising the spirit of parliamentary democracy. President Zardari’s position as the co-chairman of the ruling party makes him a kind of super prime minister. Furthermore, the judges deposed on November 2, 2007 by President Musharraf have not been restored and so the superior judiciary comes under the influence of the newly elected president.
To create a workable political system and a true spirit of democracy, President Zardari should take a number of corrective steps. First, the judiciary must be restored to its November 2, 2007 position. This should not take place on a pick-and-choose basis. A law minister recently spoke of the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry taking his oath from the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) Chief Justice, which is a discouraging sign given that the PCO was established under the previous emergency rule. It gives the impression that the new government wants to have a judiciary of its choice. It is not a question of personal likes and dislikes. It is a question of adhering to the principle that a commander of the army has no legitimacy to arrest or remove judges. Musharraf’s act was illegitimate and immoral act and must be reversed.
The second measure Zardari must take is the repeal of the 17th amendment of the constitution and other changes in the supreme law. These amendments and changes were introduced to enhance Musharraf’s powers, effectively transforming the constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential form of government and giving the president enormous powers. President Zardari can undo these wrongs by surrendering these powers to the prime minister and to the parliament, thus restoring the true spirit of the 1973 constitution. There is a lot of suspicion in the country that Zardari might take only cosmetic steps, thus retaining the president’s current powerful position.

Even with reduced constitutional powers, President Zardari can influence the process of peace making in the border areas of Northwest Pakistan and the Baluchistan province. The new president can use his influence to defuse the conflict through dialogue with his fellow Pakistanis. Musharraf alienated these vital sections of society by resorting to ruthless force. He acted like a proxy to a big power, looking after their interests rather than protecting his own citizens. President Zardari could also enhance his prestige by seeking the whereabouts of missing Pakistanis – a huge issue which directly relates to the humiliation of the entire nation.

President Asif Ali Zardari has gained the confidence of the legislatures. He should feel confident and reassured enough to restore the rule of law and with it the sovereignty, respect and dignity of Pakistan.

General Musharraf, A Dignified Exit

Thu, 14 Aug 2008 14:45:59 -0400

“Old Generals never die, they just fade away.” After nearly nine years as Pakistan’s military dictator and President, it is time for Pervez Musharraf to step aside in the interests of his country.

Musharraf’s long ride as head of the “world’ s most dangerous country” is as remarkable for its achievements as it is for its disappointments. It is fair to argue that he was the right man in 1999 when a military coup ousted civilian politicians whom the public saw as voraciously corrupt. Musharraf implemented an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, surrounded himself with world-class technocrats to steer the economy and promised a return to democracy.

General Musharraf was the right man again in 2001. He reversed Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan that provided safe harbor to Al Qaeda. Pakistan’s military intelligence service, the ISI, worked seamlessly for a couple of years with the FBI and CIA to bring down Al Qaeda safe houses in cities throughout Pakistan.

The Pakistani people benefited. The US lifted the failing economy with grant aid and removed sanctions related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Foreign investment and remittances poured in. The economy grew at an average of more than 7% annually. Musharraf liberalized the media and presided over an earthquake relief program in 2005 that avoided what could have been a humanitarian disaster.

But, his failures were as striking as his successes.

Extremism under his leadership spread like a California wild fire. Al Qaeda reestablished training camps and a global operation via the Internet from the Afghan-Pakistan border region. Musharraf’s supposedly first-rate Pakistan Army and ISI couldn’t find and dismantle Mullah Omar’s Taliban followers – presumably being directed from the provincial capital of Quetta. And now, at a time when extremist violence openly targets Pakistan’s officials and threatens national stability, the ISI reportedly has aided militant groups in an attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

Musharraf’s counter terrorism efforts are unpopular with his people as well. Eight out of ten Pakistanis oppose military action against the Taliban. They blame Musharraf for doing the bidding of the Bush Administration.

Musharraf’s fall from grace with his public was in large part due to his resistance to the transition to civilian democracy. His personal contempt for civilian politicians was palpable. Only after intense international and public pressure did he finally take off his dual hat as both Chief of the Army and president.

Perhaps the episode that began Musharraf’s final slide in popularity was his assault on the independent judiciary. Musharraf tried to remove Supreme Court Justice Iftikar Chaudhry in March 2007. Tens of thousands of Pakistan’s most educated people took to the streets to support the chief justice. Musharraf forcibly put down the demonstrations. Judges and lawyers were placed under house arrest. Last November, he imposed emergency rule, suspended the constitution and then amended it to provide more powers to presidency. Musharraf then used emergency powers to tilt the impending elections in favor of his party. The Musharraf of 2007 was not the same leader of 1999 and 2001.

Still, Pakistani democracy was resilient. In a tragic way, the assassination of leading political figure Benazir Bhutto just before the election ensured enough new voters to overwhelm any fix in place. The new Chief of the Army, General Kiyani is credited for refusing to allow Pakistan’s strongest institution to be used by the government to manipulate the February, 2008 election.

That should have been the start of a happier story for Pakistan. But six months after the civilian government assumed power, it found itself paralyzed over how to deal with the president and the judiciary. After squabbling for months, the coalition government now has agreed to proceed with impeachment proceedings against Musharraf. The process of bringing a no-confidence vote to the provincial assemblies, followed by hearings on impeachment charges by the regional assembly and senate, could paralyze Pakistan’s government for weeks to come and create a major distraction from the country's pressing problems.

President Musharraf could fight back against the elected government. He could use his constitutional powers to dissolve the parliament, a move that would ignite a popular uprising. To prevail Musharraf would need the army to join him at the barricades. To its credit, the army is neither anxious to see the impeachment of its former chief or to intervene on his behalf.

The logical way out would be for the military and others, including the Bush Administration, to press Musharraf to resign in exchange for an agreement by the parties to take no further action against him. Anything else will plunge the Pakistan into a prolonged crisis from which extremist elements could be the prime beneficiaries.

Lebanon’s Shia Deserve a Greater Voice

Tue, 18 Mar 2008 11:29:00 -0400

American objectives in Lebanon are clear, reasonable and honorable. The United States wants an independent, democratic Lebanon free from foreign interference, particularly from Syria and Iran. It also wants a prosperous Lebanon at peace with its neighbors, including Israel.

The question is why have these fair and reasonable goals been so difficult to attain? There is no single answer, but what is clear is that the United States does not understand the long-term political changes taking place in Lebanon and how they interfere with American objectives. Most important among these changes is the increasing influence of the Lebanese Shia community, which necessitates a redistribution of power within the Lebanese government.

At the time of its founding, the diversity of the Lebanese population was unique in the Arab world. In particular, the large Christian population made Lebanon the only Christian-dominated Arab state. Instruments of power were divided between Christians and Muslims with the preponderance of power resting with the Christians. The President, the army commander and a majority in parliament were Christian. The Muslims, however, had sufficient levers of power to prevent the government from taking actions inimical to their interests. The Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, usually the head of the internal security forces, and a blocking minority in Parliament were Muslim. In this way, Christian control was assured, but Muslim interests were protected.

By the mid-1970’s, demographic shifts and changing regional politics created a rift between the actual division of power and political reality. The original political compact no longer represented the interests of all. After 15 years of civil war, the 1989 Taif agreement codified a new distribution of power. As painful as this was to the dominant Christian community, peace could not have come without the acceptance of a new political reality – equality between Muslims and Christians.

In the 18 years since Taif, demographic and regional political circumstances have again created a rift between the division of power and political reality. The crucial imbalance of power this time is not between Muslim and Christian, but between Sunni and Shia. Since the founding of the state, the Sunnis have dominated Muslim politics just as the Christians dominated national politics before Taif. Over time, the demographic and political balance has shifted in favor of the Shia, but no corresponding shift in the distribution of power within the government has occurred. If peace and normalcy are to return to Lebanon, Shia interests must be protected within the executive branch.

Each community – Christian, Sunni, and Shia – must be assured that the government will not and cannot make decisions against its vital interests. Under the current situation, the Shia do not have this protection. Christians and Sunnis have the power to block any government action, but the Shia do not. Christians control the Presidency, command the army, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. Similarly, the Sunnis appoint the Prime Minister, command the internal security forces, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. In comparison, the Shia have no controlling position in the Lebanese executive branch, and they, therefore, must rely on the Speaker of the Parliament and their militia to protect the community’s interest.

The current crisis began in late 2006 when all Shia Cabinet members resigned their posts terminating the ruling consensus. They thought that without a consensus, the government would have to reconstitute itself and thus address their concerns. However, the decision was made to continue governing without them, which highlighted the Shia’s inability to protect their own interests within the executive branch. Having the limited powers of the Speaker of Parliament as their only recourse, many Shia turned to their primary source of strength outside the government – Hezbollah – for leadership and protection.

The dominance of Hezbollah within the Lebanese Shia community is likely to continue so long as the Shia do not have the power within the government to prevent the government from taking actions against their interests. A lasting solution to the current crisis is not likely unless the Shia are afforded the same protection from government mistreatment that the Christians and Sunnis enjoy. In the short term, affording them a blocking third – 11 of 30 members – in the Cabinet would appear to be the only way the Shia could protect their interests from inside the executive branch of government.

Many argue that the Shia community should not be given “veto” power over government policies, out of fear of increasing the influence of Hezbollah. In fact the opposite is likely to be true. Empowerment of the Shia community would allow a wider diversity of views and over time would diminish the influence of Hezbollah. Until the Shia are guaranteed that the Lebanese government cannot act against their interests, in the same way it cannot act against Christian and Sunni interests, they will protect themselves by looking outside the government and obstructing the governing process. Under such circumstances, the influence of Hezbollah is likely to increase.

If the American goal of a free, democratic, peaceful and prosperous Lebanon and a diminished role for Hezbollah is to be achieved, then, as a prerequisite, the Lebanese Shia community needs a guarantee that the government of Lebanon cannot act without Shia concurrence. Each of the three principal communities—Christian, Sunni and Shia—needs this guarantee. A failure to equal protection to the Shia is likely to lead to greater instability and the strengthening of Hezbollah.

Pakistan at a Crossroad

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:39:52 -0500

Over the next several years, Pakistan will either become the nation that the clear majority of its people want – a modern democracy based on constitutional law – or, it will implode under extreme pressures and fall under autocratic rule by Islamist extremists. The general elections on February 18 are an important but not the only step in determining that outcome.

American analysts often simplify the struggle in Pakistan as a battle between moderates and extremists, but Pakistanis understand that it is really about law. Is the nation to be governed by laws based on a constitution, or on God’s law -- Sharia law?

Most Pakistanis view their country as the constitutional democracy their founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, envisioned it to be. They have respect for their constitution and rule of law in the western tradition, and only welcomed Pervez Musharraf’s bloodless military coup in 1999 because he promised to end corruption and then restore civilian democracy.

But Musharraf balked at taking off his uniform and undermined the rule of law by declaring Emergency rule, jailing democratic activists and sacking the independent Supreme Court. Pakistani political elites criticize the United States for tenaciously supporting Musharraf’s military regime. They believe we value counter- terrorism before democracy.

The US has been respected in Pakistan and throughout the world for the righteousness of our core values of democracy, fairness, and justice. We must act on those values. The most compelling gesture our President could make to win the support of Pakistani people would be to firmly call for the reinstatement of the former Supreme Court Justices, including Iftikar Chaudhry. The US should continue to support the rule of law, protection of people, clean and fair elections contested on a level playing field.

It is true we both fear extremism as the most dangerous threat to Pakistan. The impatient response to the threat is with bullets and bombs. Perhaps a more enduring and ultimately successful strategy is through the ballet box and pocket book.

The United States has provided Pakistan over $11 billion in aid since 2002. But over 90% was security related assistance. It had little impact on the poorest civilian sectors of the society. It is time to shift US assistance from defense to development o foster programs that support job creation, education and health. In the long run, a shift in US aid priorities would do much to calm dissent, and stifle the attraction of militant jihadism than bombs and bullets.

Pakistan has in its midst an active militant jihadist element that threatens to ignite a young and frustrated population. To be successful our policies need to be based on a clear understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people, and not just our own interests.

Pakistan is struggling through a volatile period of transition. We must adjust our policies to best serve the Pakistani people and their struggle for a stable democracy. No matter the outcome, the election this month may create new uncertainties and we must be prepared to deal with them in a way that can benefit both our nations.

Pakistan's Best Chance

Wendy J. Chamberlin and Marvin Weinbaum — Thu, 3 Jan 2008 10:29:58 -0500

Rarely in situations of such volatility as Pakistan faces today is the objective so clear. Pakistan needs stability. The greatest threat to the country derives from internal terrorism, lawlessness and fractured regional politics.

Can national stability best be secured through a strongman government of the kind offered by President Pervez Musharraf? Or is stability best guaranteed through a democratic election that restores civilian rule committed to cracking down on extremist violence, building the rule of law and delivering services to the people? Benazir Bhutto promoted the second option. Tragically, she died doing so.

The former prime minister's assassination is being called a victory for the forces of extremism and a heavy setback for the cause of democracy. Her murder brought down an eloquent advocate for both a progressive state and society and more aggressive policies against al-Qaeda and domestic terrorists.

Many may argue for proceeding with the parliamentary elections scheduled for Jan. 8. The hope is that free and fair elections could calm the anger over the events of this week and prevent a return to military dictatorship.

The trouble with this thinking is that most Pakistanis believe the election process is already unfree and unfair. Changes Musharraf made to the courts and constitution during the six-week period of emergency rule this fall had tilted the process in his favor long before Bhutto's death. These elections are already too tainted to win public credibility.

We believe the path to a stable Pakistan does begin with elections, but not through the process that is unfolding. What Pakistan needs is a pause and then a bold regrouping. Elections are an opportunity, however challenging, to change the tenor and course of Pakistani politics -- of being a transforming event.

If Musharraf is to remain president, he should quickly reach out to all political parties in a spirit of national reconciliation. This represents the best hope of saving Pakistan from an extended period of instability. His first step should be to name a neutral caretaker government, one whose members are selected on the basis of consultation with the major political groups.

Musharraf would instantly win national approval if he reappointed the Supreme Court justices he deposed during emergency rule; this would be a magnanimous gesture of his commitment to building an independent judiciary. A new federal election commission, willing and capable of enforcing its own regulations, must be named, and the present campaigning restrictions must be lifted. The authorities should also update the gerry-built electoral rolls to better insure against disenfranchising some voters and allowing others to cast fraudulent ballots. Government limitations on media coverage of politics should be lifted. Most critical, the administration of elections must be taken out of the hands of local officials, many of whom are loyal to the governing party above all else.

Ideally, out of this new political chemistry, another breed of leaders will emerge -- one defined by a commitment to democratic principles and values rather than family or regional affiliation. From its current low point, Pakistan has a rare chance for renewal or, even more boldly, reinvention.

An election held without these changes would result in victors who lack credibility and would almost certainly provoke a violent backlash. Reforming the process and establishing ground rules among the parties in a new political compact will take months. But these changes can be conducted in a spirit of inclusion and transparency so that a longer process of change does not appear as just an excuse for extending Musharraf's dictatorial powers. Above all, the military must stand back from the political scene and exercise its legitimate role of defending the nation and constitution.

The U.S. role in Pakistan is delicate. Our relationship is with the Pakistani people, not one man or one institution. Our close embrace of Pervez Musharraf (and, to an extent, Benazir Bhutto) contributes to his unpopularity and to low U.S. approval ratings in Pakistan. We must support honest attempts to foster reconciliation across civil society. Above all, the U.S. administration must not be seen to be engineering a political outcome. This is the surest way to undermine what we are hopeful of achieving. The United States has a high stake in Pakistan's stability, but we must leave the selection of Pakistan's leaders to the Pakistani people.

Iraq: Maliki in Crisis

Wayne White — Mon, 20 Aug 2007 16:00:28 -0400

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appears to be trying to address the serious divisions in his cabinet and a parliament in disarray amid questions as to whether there is any real hope he can ever deliver on key American goals that might draw Iraq’s Sunni Arabs back into the political mainstream.

One major question is why Maliki was named prime minister in the first place. Early last year, Washington pushed hard for Maliki to replace the disappointing Ibrahim al-Jafaari. Yet, Maliki hails from the same Da‘wa Party origins, as does Jafaari. He was not the chosen candidate among the majority of Iraqi Shi‘a powerbrokers.

To become prime minister, Maliki had to draw heavily on the support of none other than firebrand anti-US Shi‘a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. And there have been numerous indications since then that Maliki’s government has close ties to and employs members and affiliates of various Shi‘a militias, with their deep-seated anti-Sunni Arab agenda. His trips to Iran also suggest that he is closer to Tehran than the US would like — something that carries negative connotations not only relating to his dealings with Washington, but in the eyes of many Iraqis as well.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Maliki’s behavior of late is his criticism of US military cooperation with Sunni Arab insurgents against al-Qa‘ida in Iraq in al-Anbar, Salahedin and Diyala governates, as well as some neighborhoods in Baghdad. In some instances, Iraqi security forces supposedly answering to Maliki have actively tried to disrupt this valuable work. His opposition threatens to get in the way of what appears to be developing into the one potential US success story in Iraq at this time.

Despite all these negatives, the most significant question now is whether any prime minister of Iraq can deliver on critical issues such as unity, security and public services at this juncture. Despite the intense consultations taking place at this point in Baghdad and regular pep talks with President Bush, Maliki’s government remains broadly dysfunctional, riven by ethno-sectarian infighting, rampantly corrupt, mistrusted by a large number of Iraqis. It also has little ability to project its writ beyond the Green Zone to most areas of the country.

Indeed, with much of the country in shambles because of everything from falling supplies of already inadequate electricity to ethno-sectarian strife that has driven over four million Iraqis from their homes, one could argue that no matter how high-minded any Iraqi prime minister might be, success remains elusive.

This is especially true given the lack of unity and consensus within the current Iraqi government, with the exception of the alliance between Shi‘a and Kurds. A number of important questions, such as the status of oil-rich Kirkuk and the rights of regional entities to self-govern, appear to be pitting one major ethno-sectarian community against another in what they consider a zero-sum game.

The overall problem of governance in Iraq following massive looting, persistently high levels of ongoing violence and crime and seething ethno-sectarian hostilities is daunting. As early as 2005, when I was focusing on Iraq in the State Department, I had warned that failure was so likely on the part of Iraqi leaders under such trying circumstances that this situation might well produce a series of “revolving-door” prime ministers.

In this scenario, one failed prime minister would succeed another, with considerable disruption in governance in between as the process of choosing each new prime minister played out for months. Merely switching prime ministers would have relatively little overall impact without an improvement in the fundamental problems standing in the way of effective governance.

In Maliki’s case, however, the situation might be darker still. Given his association with a militant Shi‘a party and his seeming lack of a consistent sense of urgency regarding US priorities, it could very well be that he is not interested in progress toward goals set by Washington. His current efforts to pull things together appear only transitory at best.

The benchmarks being set generally favor Sunni Arabs so perhaps Maliki is playing for time in the hope that the US Administration will eventually lose interest in its quest to bring Iraq’s Sunni Arabs on board politically. Maliki may also calculate that Sunni Arabs, out of impatience or mistrust, could soon act rashly and send Washington reeling in a different and more pro-Shi‘a direction.

Solving the Saudi Succession Puzzle

Thomas W. Lippman — Wed, 29 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500

If there is one thing the ruling princes of Saudi Arabia have shown they are good at, it is self-preservation. They demonstrated their skill once again last month with an adroit political maneuver that drew little media notice in this country because of the carnage in Iraq, but could have long term significance for the the Gulf region and for the United States.

King ‘Abdullah announced a new system for choosing future kings, designed to ensure smooth continuity whenever the monarchy is vacated. He issued a new “Allegiance Institution Law” designed to cover every eventuality: death of the king; simultaneous death of the king and crown prince; temporary incapacity because of illness; and long-term disability.

This news can only be encouraging to those who wish to see long-term political and economic stability in that vital country. But it will not be encouraging to those who believe in promoting democratic reform in the Arab world because the purpose of ‘Abdullah’s move was to fortify the monarchy, not to open up the country’s political process. Its aim is not to give the Saudi people any voice in selecting their leader but rather to codify the existing informal system in which the king and his brothers have the absolute power to designate the next in line for the throne without any explanation of their decision.

The new procedure is more like the selection of a Roman Catholic pope, chosen in a secret conclave by princes of the church, than it is like any democratic system. Just as some cardinals are deemed “papabile,” or suitable to become pontiff in the event of a vacancy, a handful of the many sons and grandsons of Saudi Arabia’s founding King, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, are understood to be in the running as future kings.

No one outside the House of Saud has any real knowledge of who might be on the list. Any speculation by scholars or think-tank analysts about the line of success is just that — speculation.

Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal — sometimes mentioned himself as a possible future king—told a Washington audience on October 30 that the new law represents “a contract between the ruler and ruled. The ruler obliges himself to protect, promote, and enhance the lives and property of the ruled; and the ruled oblige themselves to protect, promote, and obey the ruler in everything but that which counters the teachings of God.” He did not say how the “ruled” took on this obligation to obey; in fact they have no choice in the matter.

This won’t matter much to American policymakers, to whom the new law will come as something of a relief because it eliminates a possible source of trouble in Saudi Arabia. Public input is irrelevant. It has been clear since ‘Abdullah met with President Bush at his Texas ranch in April 2005 that Washington was not going to press the Saudis for political liberalization because the Saudi regime is too valuable on other fronts. The Saudi regime has persuaded Bush and his advisers that it is part of the solution on the “war on terror,” not part of the problem, and therefore stability trumps reform, as it almost always has in the 60 years of the US-Saudi alliance.

In case anyone doubted that the Saudis regard themselves as beyond the reach of Bush’s quest for democratization in the Arab world, Prince Turki proclaimed it: “We are not in a hurry to experiment with foreign interpretations of democracy or methods of government,” he said.

Until the new law was issued, the question of who would become king after ‘Abdullah and his designated successor, Defense Minister Prince Sultan, was a gnawing point of concern about the Kingdom’s future. Both men are more than 80 years old, Sultan has reportedly been treated for cancer, and no one has been selected to become ruler after them.

They and other senior princes — all sons of King Abdul Aziz — have many sons of their own in positions of influence who might aspire to take over after Sultan passes from the scene. To outsiders, the potential jockeying among the princes of this “grandsons generation” has raised questions about the cohesion of the House of Saud and thus about the stability of the country.

There appears to be no other imminent threat to the ongoing rule of the al-Saud family. The wave of extremist violence that broke out in 2003 has receded. The perpetrators of the bombings that wracked Riyadh and other cities and frightened foreigners out of the country have been killed or rounded up by the security forces, and they never gained support among the general Saudi population. Moreover, because ‘Abdullah has curbed the corruption that inspired popular anger and has reached out to the country’s Shi’a Muslim minority and other marginalized groups, the House of Saud is less unpopular than it appeared to be before ‘Abdullah took over last year.

The al-Saud family has ruled what is now Saudi Arabia since the 1920s, when Abdul Aziz overpowered rivals from other tribes and unified the country. The root of the succession problem lies in the fact that Abdul Aziz fathered some 45 sons, of whom 23 are still alive, and did not specify how his successors were to be chosen. Until now it has been an informal process among the princes; it is not based on birth order, but upon negotiation and compromise within the family.

Thus, the most serious threat to stability appeared to be the possibility that the princes would split in a power struggle, as they did in the 1960’s. The contest of that decade pitted two other sons of Abdul Aziz, Faisal and Saud against each other and traumatized the family. Ever since then such matters have been thrashed out among the princes, out of public view. When ‘Abdullah became king upon the death of his half-brother Fahd last year, he promptly named another half-brother, Sultan, as crown prince. Many Saudi-watchers believe the likeliest candidate after Sultan is Prince Salman, a half-brother of ‘Abdullah and a full brother of Sultan. Salman, aged 70, is the longtime governor of Riyadh.

Under a 1992 law, “Rule passes to the sons of the founding king...and to their children’s children. The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in accordance with the principles of the Holy Koran and the tradition of the Venerable Prophet,” Muhammad. But the law also gave the king the power to choose his successor. What would happen if other princes did not accept the designated heir as the “most upright” was not clear?

Now King Abdullah has established a more formal system. He created a committee of princes, called the “Allegiance Institution,” to designate future crown princes. Because Sultan has already been chosen as next in line after Abdullah, the new system will take effect only after Sultan becomes king. Once that happens, and in all future cases, the new king is to nominate one, two or three candidates to be his successor. Committee members may accept a nominee or reject all three. “If the committee rejects all the nominees, it will name a Crown Prince whom it considers to be suitable,” according to a translation provided by the embassy.

This process is to be completed within 30 days. In the past, long intervals of uncertainty have sometimes ensued as a new king has delayed naming a successor.

Perhaps more important, the new law specifies the procedures to be followed if the king is incapacitated. This is clearly intended to avoid a repetition of the uncomfortable period between 1995 and 2005, when Fahd was disabled by a stroke. ‘Abdullah was de facto ruler, but his power was limited because he was not king; many important reforms were delayed or set aside because of that vacuum.

The official announcement of the new system does not answer all questions — it says members of the Allegiance Institution must be “capable and known for their integrity” but does not say how those qualities are to be determined, nor does it specify what happens after the passing of all the grandsons, many already approaching old age. Nevertheless, given the way the House of Saud operates, it can be assumed that ‘Abdullah issued his decree only after extensive discussion with his brothers and probably some of the key nephews, and that they have signed off on it. That means the family will not allow or encourage any aspirant to stake a claim outside the system when the time comes.

Once again the House of Saud displays its talent for survival.

Iraq Security and Accountability

Wayne White — Thu, 2 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The recent controversy over missing weapons underscores how our own carelessness often has aided the insurgency as well as Iraq’s burgeoning militias. This is an old story, going back to our earliest efforts to “stand up” the Iraqi army and police during the first year after the Iraq invasion.

Originally used in the comic strip “Pogo” during the Vietnam War, the expression “we have met the enemy, and they are us,” has become all too true of so much of what has gone wrong in Iraq. The missing weapons story epitomizes these continuing failures.

While still in government and dealing with Iraq in 2003-2004, I voiced concern about how the weapons that Coalition forces were turning over to the fledgling Iraqi police in particular were being used. My concern was that such weapons and ammunition could pass into the hands of the insurgency via police cadres, some of whom were insurgent sympathizers. These concerns unfortunately appear to have been confirmed in news reports this week.

Given the lack of control and accountability in many instances, it is surprising that the number of missing weapons is not higher. More worrisome is the inadequate number of US troops in Iraq to train the Iraqi security forces and monitor them as they take over from us in an effective manner. In fact, this shortage has been a critical factor in all areas of military activity, especially the all-important missions of clearing, holding and rebuilding areas previously hosting Sunni Arab insurgents.

As for the missing weapons, those close to the Iraq issue agree that the police were too hastily fielded and have proven to be of dubious reliability. The missing weapons may only be the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Police have been caught red-handed operating with insurgent elements. Many weapons, accounted for in police stations by day, could easily have been used overnight by insurgents, other equally violent types, or even criminals.

The problem of misuse almost certainly increased this year. Many police have been accused of being members of, affiliated with, or cooperating with Shi’a militias, such as the Mahdi Army of militant cleric Muqtada al-Sadr or the Badr Organization of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Police were reported to have directly participated in some bloody sectarian rampages, such as the one a few weeks ago in the town of Balad, located north of Baghdad.

With the wave of vicious sectarian bloodletting this year, the people who are doing the killing have victimized many thousands of innocent Iraqis. Perhaps the worst area of such abuse is centered in the Mahdi Militia’s bastion of Sadr City, the vast, relatively poor and largely Shi’a section of Baghdad.

Should the US pursue a proposal now under consideration to expand the number of Iraqi security forces, the focus should be on the more highly-trained and reliable army, not the police. It is critical also that such an expansion should not divert resources intended for existing army units, many of which have not fully matured, in part because of the pressing need for more and better weapons and equipment. If existing Iraqi army units do not get what they so badly need, the overall quality of Iraqi security forces would be diluted, further delaying their ability to take to the field in significant numbers and ease the burden on overstretched Coalition forces. But that should not exempt the Iraqi army from full accountability for the weapons and equipment it receives.

Washington and Iraqi Governance: Time to Back Off

Wayne White — Tue, 10 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0400

A series of apparent US ultimatums and veiled political threats aimed at the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in recent weeks—especially Maliki himself—is but the latest example of excessive US involvement in the Iraqi political process.

Some rather intense US involvement in various aspects of the Iraqi political scene in the Green Zone has continued well beyond the point at which this sort of thing was slated to become much reduced: the handover of sovereignty to the government of Iyad Allawi in late June 2004. At that time, Ambassador Negroponte signaled—I believe correctly—that the new US embassy in Baghdad would endeavor to assume a considerably lower profile.

This was meant to contrast with the high-profile dominance of Iraqi internal affairs by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA was deeply involved in the full range of Iraqi political, military, economic and security matters because it was, essentially, a government of occupation. Yet, especially since 2005, driven in part by the activism of Negroponte’s successor, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US has continued to intervene at a number of key junctures in the Iraqi political process.

Last year, Khalizad reportedly was a player in a number of closed-door sessions held to draft the permanent Iraqi constitution, apparently even proffering actual language in some cases. Following the latest Iraqi elections, the US intervened forcefully in order to overturn the initial decision of Iraq’s dominant Shi’a political block to extend Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s term as prime minister. Instead, Nouri al-Maliki was installed, ironically, in part, because of the support of the militant, anti-US Muqtada al-Sadr.

Maliki, however, appears to have fared little better than Jaafari in addressing Iraq’s welter of problems. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with how daunting these many challenges have proven. Nonetheless, the US appears to be reaching a point at which it might well begin pressing for the replacement of Maliki. Unfortunately, the age-old game of reshuffling political players in the face of much deeper, fundamental problems usually solves very little and wastes valuable time: in Iraq, many critical months are lost every time a new government must be formed.

And there are other compelling reasons why such intense US political interference, particularly at this late stage of the game, is ill-advised. The Iraqi government is now supposed to be fully sovereign and not nearly so subject to the whims of American politicians. Also, the overall situation is so serious that one Iraqi politician is unlikely to perform all that much better than another in effecting meaningful progress toward restoring the normalcy Iraqis so desperately crave. And, so long as the US hovers ever so closely over the Iraqi political scene, Iraqi politicians, instead of trying to work out problems among themselves, will continue to turn frequently to the US to function as a broker of sorts.

Additionally, to the extent Washington remains a major player in Iraqi politics, with the power to make or break governments, it will share a hefty portion of the blame, and rightly so—inside Iraq, the broader Middle East, and in the eyes of the international community—for likely failures in governance to come.

Many will argue that senior Iraqi politicians have not shown the ability to address the many pressing problems at hand. Persistent US meddling at the very core of the Iraqi political process is thus driven by profound—and rising—frustration over the seeming inability of any players in the current Iraqi political mainstream to stabilize the country. US impatience and political activism is therefore understandable, to some degree, because of the stakes involved. However, Washington’s repeated forays into Iraqi politics since mid-2004 have not resulted in any real improvement.

Consequently, it is time that setting the overall direction of Iraqi politics must be left to Iraqis, for better or worse. Washington must recognize that it cannot orchestrate political success in that tortured land through still more heavy-handed political tampering. And stepping back from the Iraqi political fray is a prerequisite for any overall exit strategy.